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INTRODUCTION 
In her Childress Lecture,1 Sandra Johnson performs a skillful dissection of 
medicos’ claims that the legal regime they suffer under is “bad” in a variety of 
respects.  Her aim is not just conceptual clarity, but a clearer vision of how 
reasonable legal ideas can, in implementation, decay into ineffective or even 
counterproductive exercises of regulatory power over a resistant, and in some 
instances rightfully incensed, population of well-meaning health 
professionals.2  The problems she describes arise in public health as well as in 
health care.  People toiling in the fields of public health complain, for example, 
about the ways in which broad regulatory structures, like HIPAA or the 
Common Rule, interfere with their work in pointless ways.3  Public health 
scholars have devoted much ink to the problems of clarity, specificity, and 
 
 1. Sandra H. Johnson, Professor Emerita of Law & Health Care Ethics at Saint Louis 
University School of Law, Keynote Address at the Saint Louis University School of Law Richard 
J. Childress Memorial Lecture: Still Crazy After All These Years: Is Regulating Physician 
Practice an Exercise in Futility? (Oct. 17, 2008), in Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician 
Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973 (2009). 
 2. Anyone who, like Professor Johnson, has invested enough years in trying to improve the 
regulation of health and health care, must be forgiven for phrases like “still crazy after all these 
years,” because a certain level of madness is evident in systems that seem to resist rational 
change—and reformers who keep trying.  If it is insane to believe that data and rigorous analysis 
can guide health policy toward a more optimal state, then Professor Sandra Johnson is surely 
among the most hardened cases in the asylum, and for that this Lecture offers us a wonderful 
occasion to praise and thank her.  After all, as the March Hare in the movie Alice in Wonderland 
so succinctly put it, “If you don’t care for tea, you could at least make polite conversation!”  
ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Walt Disney Productions 1951).  In fact, Professor Johnson has done 
far more than talk.  She has a distinguished record of policy change, not least in the area of access 
to pain medication during her service as head of the Mayday Project.  We dedicate this Article to 
her on the occasion of her retirement. 
 3. See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Applying the Common Rule to Public Health Agencies: 
Questions and Tentative Answers About a Separate Regulatory Regime, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
638 (2003); Julie R. Ingelfinger & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Registry Research and Medical Privacy, 
350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1452 (2004); Douglas B. McCarthy et al., Medical Records and Privacy: 
Empirical Effects of Legislation, 34 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 417 (1999); L. Turnberg, Common 
Sense and Common Consent in Communicable Disease Surveillance, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 27 
(2003). 
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usability of basic public health powers, and debated whether statutory reform 
in public health helps or interferes with good practice.4 
At the heart of Professor Johnson’s treatment plan for “bad law” is a sound 
appreciation for empirical facts.  She elevates empiricism to the level of a 
“cultural norm” in health law, affirming the value of data, the need to collect it, 
and the obligation to consider it as an important part of what health lawyers 
do.5  She implies that examining how laws are actually implemented, and their 
outcomes in real life, disciplines policy: it requires us to hypothesize our 
outcomes, measure them, and respond to inevitable shortcomings and 
unintended consequences.  Empiricism certainly does so in theory, and may 
often do so helpfully in vivo, even if real life lags behind theory.  In public 
health, if not in medicine, lawyers who do not value data have little in common 
with the professionals they collaborate with or represent. 
Yet valuing data in public health policy is not the same as making public 
health policy with data in mind.  Indeed, there are swaths of important public 
health laws that operate for the most part as “data-free zones,” realms where 
data not only fails to guide policy but does not even get a respectful hearing.  
What is worse, some of these laws include self-preservation mechanisms that 
block the generation of empirical knowledge that may prompt calls for their 
revision.  No policy area exemplifies this more regrettably than the one we will 
probe in this Article: drug control policy.6  Under the banner of protecting the 
populace, the United States continues to expend vast resources to prevent and 
eliminate the use of illicit drugs.7  Drug use nevertheless remains a significant 
public health problem in this country.8  The injection of illicit drugs, especially 
 
 4. Compare Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of 
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59 (1999), with Edward P. 
Richards & Katharine C. Rathbun, Legislative Alternatives to the Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act (MSEHPA) (LSU Program in Law, Sci., & Pub. Health, White Paper No. 2, 2003), 
available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/MSEHPA_review.htm. 
 5. Professor Johnson’s prescription resonates with Wendy Parmet’s argument in her new 
book.  Professor Parmet offers a thorough and compelling account of public health as a 
fundamental legal norm in our constitutional order.  Her argument provides a rationale for courts 
to integrate an epidemiological, evidence-based population perspective into their legal analysis, 
and to do so with the explicit recognition that advancing public health is one of the central 
purposes of our system.  See WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 
(2009). 
 6. See generally ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: 
LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, & PLACES (2001) (framing the drug control problem as 
an empirical question and assessing the state of evidence). 
 7. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: FY 2009 BUDGET SUMMARY 13 
tbl. 3 (2008) (according to the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, federal spending on 
the drug war in 2002 totaled $10.781 billion, rising to $12.005 billion in 2004, and $13.844 
billion in 2007). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
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among the most underprivileged, underserved social groups—the homeless, 
those with severe mental health problems, commercial sex workers, and 
others—continues to be particularly harmful, both to those injection drug users 
(IDUs) and to their families and the community at large.9  Few, if any, scholars 
would argue that national drug policy has benefited these IDUs and the 
communities in which they cluster.  In fact, many scholars suggest that 
national drug policy over the last half century has actually exacerbated the 
harms associated with injection drug use.10  This is as ironic as it is 
unfortunate, inasmuch as the injection practices of the chronically homeless11 
and other high-risk populations may be responsible for the lion’s share of the 
individual and social costs of illicit drug use.12 
There are inherent difficulties in crafting interventions that benefit 
homeless and extremely vulnerable populations and their communities, 
including the high prevalence of mental and behavioral problems, local 
variation in homelessness as a social phenomenon, and the stigmatized 
stereotypes of drug users and homeless or marginally housed people.  Crafting 
interventions that effectively address the epidemic of addiction in this country 
is a difficult challenge, but the inherent challenges are greatly magnified by the 
functionally centralized and politically charged nature of drug policy in the 
United States.  Although there have been some welcome changes in recent 
years, including the (painfully) gradual acceptance of sterile syringe access 
programs, drug policy in the United States continues to be dominated by the 
ideology and practice of strict federal prohibition.  While there are no perfect 
solutions to problems of severe drug dependence, unenlightened and inflexible 
 
 9. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (noting the harms to injection drug users 
and the negative externalities of public injection drug use, including discarded needles, the spread 
of disease, public intoxication, and depleted emergency services). 
 10. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (noting how current policies have created 
an environment that encourages harmful injection behavior). 
 11. Our use of the term “homeless” in the remainder of the piece includes populations living 
proverbially near or on the streets.  Many IDUs who inject publicly might have access to housing, 
but not sufficient privacy to inject there. 
 12. As colorfully described by the economist Malcolm Gladwell, and in contrast with the 
popular perception that the cost of providing services to homeless, substance-abusing populations 
follows a normal distribution, it may well be the case that a small group of the chronic substance-
abusers are disproportionately costly for municipalities.  See Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar 
Murray: Why Problems like Homelessness May Be Easier to Solve than to Manage, NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, at 96, 98–99.  In fact, caring for some homeless persons who abuse 
alcohol and drugs costs local municipalities as much as one million dollars a year, each in 
unreimbursed ambulance and emergency room care, whereas the cost of providing housing, 
support, and prevention services to most homeless persons is much lower.  See id. at 97.  
Ambulance utilization is a particularly costly expense related to injection drug overdose.  See 
infra notes 33–38, 83 and accompanying text. 
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national drug policy has stifled opportunities to explore more locally 
responsive and scientifically derived public health interventions. 
In the face of federal claims to sole practical jurisdiction over drug policy, 
and the failure of our policies to measurably improve the health of the most 
vulnerable IDUs and their communities, some scholars have argued that policy 
makers at the state and local level are better-positioned than the federal 
government to craft innovative, targeted interventions—and should be allowed 
to do so.13  One particularly promising intervention, the supervised injection 
facility (SIF), may represent a medically effective and economically efficient 
strategy for reducing the incidence and harms of injection drug use among the 
chronically homeless and otherwise marginalized people.14 
SIFs are facilities where drug users can self-administer pre-obtained drugs 
under the supervision of healthcare providers.15  International evidence shows 
the SIF to be a plausible intervention for promoting public health and order, 
and there is marked interest among some states and localities in piloting an SIF 
in their jurisdictions.16  In a rational policy-making climate, the intervention 
would be tested, evaluated, and then scaled up, modified, or abandoned as the 
evidence directed.  In the United States, the testing and deployment of SIFs 
will be what one might call a mixed question of evidence and ideology: merely 
testing the intervention will entail sustained political and legal struggle.  The 
authority to operate an SIF often can be found in the broad police power that 
states and localities have to act for the protection and furtherance of the public 
health.17  However, the authorization of an SIF by a state or locality is open to 
challenge by federal law enforcement agencies as a violation of federal law.18  
In crafting strategies, negotiating with opponents, or disputing in court, the 
 
 13. See, e.g., Scott Burris & Steffanie A. Strathdee, To Serve and Protect? Toward a Better 
Relationship Between Drug Control Policy and Public Health, 20 AIDS 117 (2006). 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. Ian Malkin, Establising Supervised Injecting Facilities: A Responsible Way to Help 
Minimise Harm, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 680 (2001). 
 16. We are aware of discussions about SIFs among health advocates in a number of U.S. 
cities.  Consideration has gone furthest in San Francisco.  See Lisa Leff, San Francisco Considers 
Injection Room, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2007/10/18/AR2007101801701.html.  In a public meeting in May, even a police captain in 
the Tenderloin section of San Francisco publicly advocated setting up an SIF.  C.W. Nevius, 
Tenderloin Cop Gets Neighborhood’s Attention, SFGATE, May 29, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/ 
cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/05/28/BA5V10VC02.DTL.  A forum “Safe Injection Facilities of 
New York” took place on May 22, 2009.  Feature: Effort to Bring Safe Injection Facility to New 
York City Getting Underway, DRUG WAR CHRON., May 29, 2009, available at http://stopthedrug 
war.org/chronicle/587/fulltext#1. 
 17. See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
 18. We assume that state authorization is more likely than federal authorization due to 
political realities, but note that federal authority could support the creation of an SIF as well.  See 
infra note 90. 
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stakeholders will be wading into the unpredictable waters of federalism 
jurisprudence and statutory interpretation that have been further muddied by 
recent decisions regarding medical marijuana, assisted suicide, gun-free school 
zones, and other medical and health issues.  The practicalities of enforcement 
in a federal system also have to be considered; as the medical marijuana 
experience indicates, an enterprise legal under state law may be able to operate 
at a fairly substantial scale over a sustained period of time, in spite of being 
considered illegal under federal law.19 
The primary aim of this Article is to demonstrate that a state (or even some 
city governments) could authorize and, in legal terms, successfully operate an 
SIF.  States have the authority to enact “health laws of every description.”20  If 
federal law enforcers assert that a state-sponsored SIF is illegal, there are 
reasonable legal arguments that states may raise to the contrary.  Though the 
legal deck may appear to be stacked in favor of the federal government, states 
or localities with the political will to advance evidence-based public health 
have ample legal room to maneuver.21 
We begin, in Part I, by describing the persistent harms of injection drug 
use and the public health evidence behind SIFs—the kind of evidence that 
should guide policy.  Part II explains the various mechanisms for authorizing 
an SIF under state law.  Part III begins by briefly explaining the dual (state and 
federal) regulation of controlled substances in the United States, and then 
considers how a state would counter a federal challenge to a state-authorized 
SIF.  This analysis considers relevant provisions of existing federal statutes—
principally, but not exclusively, the “Crack House Statute”22—and 
demonstrates how principles of statutory interpretation support a plausible 
construction of these provisions in favor of the legality of an SIF.  We also 
discuss the arguments that could be raised as to the scope of federal power to 
limit state public health measures having no impact on interstate commerce.  
The interests in preserving state police power are most acute when the state has 
taken the initiative in providing crucially needed medical care and protecting 
the public health. 
The secondary aim of this Article, in the spirit of Professor Johnson’s 
Childress address, is to highlight the importance of empirical inquiry in drug 
policy in particular and public health law generally.  In drug policy as in many 
other difficult areas of regulation—from obesity, to firearms, to smoking—we 
 
 19. See David Samuels, Dr. Kush: How Medical Marijuana Is Transforming the Pot 
Industry, NEW YORKER, July 28, 2008, at 48, 50. 
 20. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21. In practical terms, “room to maneuver” encompasses authorizing an SIF, funding its 
operation and evaluation, protecting it politically from law enforcement interference, and 
defending it legally from any action meant to stop it from operating. 
 22. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2006). 
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do not actually know what policy interventions will work best, in the plain 
sense of maximizing the level and distribution of public health benefits in a 
way that uses resources wisely and does not create new, unintended problems.  
This is not, strictly speaking, an evidence problem: we have enough evidence 
to begin testing plausible policies in all these areas, but not enough evidence to 
make doubt unreasonable.  Even when strong evidence supports a particular 
approach, evidence about policy is rarely incontestable and even more rarely 
determinative.  In our Conclusion, we distinguish evidence-based health policy 
from “policy learning,” and discuss how the difference matters.  We end with 
observations about the well-tried, but nonetheless surely true, potential of 
states to act as the laboratories for policy-learning in difficult areas like drug 
policy.23 
I.  IDUS AND SIFS 
A. Injection Drug Use and Its Harms 
Injection drug use has been a public health problem in the United States for 
centuries,24 but has for the most part been treated as a matter of criminal 
deviance rather than chemical dependency.  “Getting tough on drugs” is a 
grand American tradition.25  Along with the powerful abuse potential of some 
illicit drugs, American drug policy has been tinted by cultural factors like 
racism26 and the temperance movement.27  In spite of strict regulation, 
 
 23. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”). 
 24. See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 1–13 
(expanded ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. 1987) (1973) (noting that injection drug use dates back to 
the nineteenth century); see also LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., MONITORING THE FUTURE NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975–2006 
(2007), available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/vol2_2006.pdf 
(detailing the current trends in heroin abuse); Lawrence Kolb & A.G. Du Mez, The Prevalence 
and Trend of Drug Addiction in the United States and Factors Influencing It, 39 PUB. HEALTH 
REP. 1179 (1924); H. Pickering & Gerry V. Stimson, Prevalence and Demographic Factors of 
Stimulant Use, 89 ADDICTION 1385, 1386–67 (1994). 
 25. See MUSTO, supra note 24. 
 26. JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, COCAINE, CRIME, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 26–27 (1986); Edward Huntington Williams, Negro Cocaine “Fiends” Are a New 
Southern Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1914, at 12; see also Report of the Committee on 
Acquirement of the Drug Habit, PROC. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N FIFTIETH ANN. MEETING 
572 (1902) (“If the Chinaman cannot get along without his ‘dope,’ we can get along without 
him.”). 
 27. MUSTO, supra note 24, at 5–12. 
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unrelenting prosecution, and the enforcement of a powerful stigma of drug 
abuse, however, the number of IDUs in the United States has steadily 
increased.28 
There is no question that injection drug use is dangerous.  IDUs are at high 
risk of acquiring blood-borne diseases such as hepatitis and HIV.29  Life-
threatening health problems resulting from injection with unsterile equipment 
include abscesses and bacterial infections.30  Overdose also significantly 
 
 28. Reports in the 1980s suggested that there were at least 1 to 1.5 million IDUs.  NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., PREVENTING HIV TRANSMISSION: THE ROLE OF STERILE 
NEEDLES AND BLEACH 58 (Jacques Normand et al. eds., 1995).  Studies from the early 1990s 
suggested that the number of IDUs had grown to about 1.7 million.  Id. at 59.  The most recent 
survey data indicates that as many as 3.4 million Americans have injected illicit drugs at some 
time in their life.  Gregory L. Armstrong, Injection Drug Users in the United States, 1979–2002, 
167 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 166, 169 (2007); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG 
CONTROL: U.S. NONMILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA IS BEGINNING TO SHOW INTENDED 
RESULTS, BUT PROGRAMS ARE NOT READILY SUSTAINABLE 1, 5 (2004) (explaining that despite 
expending $3.3 billion between 2000 and 2004 in attempting to slow the importation of 
Colombian cocaine, “cocaine prices nationwide have remained relatively stable—indicating that 
cocaine is still readily available—and Colombia dominates the market for heroin in the 
northeastern United States”); Samuel R. Friedman et al., Estimating Numbers of Injecting Drug 
Users in Metropolitan Areas for Structural Analyses of Community Vulnerability and for 
Assessing Relative Degrees of Service Provision for Injecting Drug Users, 81 J. URB. HEALTH 
377, 380 (2004) (estimating that there were 1,364,874 IDUs in the United States in 1998).  
Estimations of the incidence and persistence of injection drug use in the last two decades, even 
when growth rates appear flat, are particularly disturbing when compared with the exponential 
growth in the incarceration of people convicted of drug-related offenses.  See PAIGE M. 
HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2004, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS BULLETIN 10 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p04.pdf 
(noting that from 1995 to 2004, the number of federal prisoners incarcerated for drug offenses 
grew by almost 50%); JENNIFER C. KARBERG & DORIS J. JAMES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE, ABUSE, AND TREATMENT OF JAIL INMATES, 2002, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 2 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/sdatji02.pdf (stating that 68% of inmates entering jail in 2002 were “dependent on or 
abus[ing] alcohol or drugs”). 
 29. See Miriam J. Alter, Prevention of Spread of Hepatitis C, 36 HEPATOLOGY S93, S94–95 
(2002); Richard S. Garfein et al., Prevalence and Incidence of Hepatitis C Virus Infection Among 
Young Adult Injection Drug Users, 18 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME & HUM. 
RETROVIROL S11 (1998); Juan C. Reyes et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Hepatitis C Virus 
Infection Among Street-Recruited Injection Drug Users in San Juan, Puerto Rico, 83 J. URB. 
HEALTH 1105 (2006); Rebecca Wells et al., Hepatitis A Prevalence Among Injection Drug Users, 
19 CLINICAL LABORATORY SCI. 12 (2006); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Factsheet, Drug-Associated HIV Transmission Continues in the United 
States, May 2002, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/factsheets/PDF/idu.pdf. 
 30. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Soft 
Tissue Infections Among Injection Drug Users—San Francisco, California, 1996–2000, 50 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 381 (2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
PDF/wk/mm5019.pdf. 
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threatens IDUs, a danger illustrated by hundreds of deaths in 2007 connected 
to the adulteration of street heroin with the synthetic pain-killer fentanyl.31  
The outbreak turned long-overdue attention to the high number of fatal 
overdose incidents involving heroin and other opioid drugs.32  Injection drug 
use accounts for a third of this country’s cumulative AIDS cases.33  Injection 
drug use—and particularly injection in public—threatens the community well-
being in the form of discarded needles34 and the intoxicated behavior of those 
who inject publicly. 
Public injection drug use indirectly harms communal health by forcing 
localities and municipalities to expend scarce public resources inefficiently.  
Significant numbers of IDUs live in economically stressed communities, and 
the health harms associated with IDUs place a large burden on emergency 
rooms, healthcare facilities, and first responders.35  In many cities, law 
enforcement officers must frequently interact with intoxicated injection drug 
users, drawing them away from other objectives and placing them in situations 
 
 31. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Nonpharmaceutical Fentanyl-Related Deaths—Multiple States, April 2005–March 2007, 57 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 793 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
PDF/wk/mm5729.pdf; Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Unintentional Poisoning Deaths—United States, 1999–2004, 56 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 93 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/ 
mm5605.pdf; see also Dan Hurley, Emergency Antidote, Direct to Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2007, at F5; Editorial, Lifeline for Addicts, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2007, at A12; Robert Sears 
& Lane Lambert, OD Antidote Controversy: Quincy Chief Supports Plan to Supply Drugs to 
Addicts; Others Disagree, PATRIOT LEDGER, Nov. 3, 2007, at 1. 
 32. Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Release from Prison—A High Risk of Death for Former 
Inmates, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 157, 158–63 (2007) (noting that newly-released inmates are a 
group at extremely high risk of overdose deaths in the first several weeks of time on the 
“outside”); Shane Darke & Deborah Zador, Fatal Heroin ‘Overdose’: A Review, 91 ADDICTION 
1765 (1996) (describing the epidemiology of heroin overdose); Karen H. Seal et al., Predictors 
and Prevention of Nonfatal Overdose Among Street-Recruited Injection Heroin Users in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, 1998–1999, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1842 (2001); Karl A. Sporer, Strategies 
for Preventing Heroin Overdose, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 442, 442 (2003). 
 33. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra 
note 29. 
 34. Scott Burris et al., State Syringe and Drug Possession Laws Potentially Influencing Safe 
Syringe Disposal by Injection Drug Users, 42 J. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N S94 (2002); P. 
Nyiri et al., Sharps Discarded in Inner City Parks and Playgrounds—Risk of Bloodborne Virus 
Exposure, 7 COMMUNICABLE DISEASE & PUB. HEALTH 287 (2004) (testing publicly discarded 
needles in London’s parks for blood-borne diseases confirmed the danger of the transmission of 
such diseases to park goers) 
 35. See Scott D. Holmberg, The Estimated Prevalence and Incidence of HIV in 96 Large US 
Metropolitan Areas, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 642, 648 (1996); Karl A. Sporer, Acute Heroin 
Overdose, 130 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 584, 584 (1999) (reporting that emergency room visits 
involving heroin climbed from 33,900 in 1990 to 70,500 in 1996). 
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for which they seldom have sufficient training.36  At the same time, 
incarceration of non-violent drug offenders is filling prisons, creating 
overcrowding, and draining public resources.37  American prisons and jails not 
only fail to meaningfully rehabilitate or treat drug abuse, but they may actually 
serve as epicenters of the spread of addiction and infectious disease through 
continued drug use and unsafe, sometimes violent, sexual practices.38 
The infection risks associated with injection drug use stem from the fact 
that many IDUs do not have ready access to sterile injection equipment or 
hygienically safe places to inject—a situation created by legal frameworks and 
shaped by law enforcement practices.39  The likelihood that IDUs will contract 
a blood-borne disease increases significantly when they inject in such settings, 
including public spaces or “shooting galleries.”40  Although opiate overdose is 
almost always reversible, witnesses often hesitate to summon first responders 
 
 36. Leo Beletsky et al., Attitudes of Police Officers Towards Syringe Access, Occupational 
Needle-Sticks, and Drug Use: A Qualitative Study of One City Police Department in the United 
States, 16 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 267 (2005). 
 37. See HARRISON & BECK, supra note 28, at 10; KARBERG & JAMES, supra note 28, at 2. 
 38. See, e.g., Mitchell I. Wolfe et al., An Outbreak of Syphilis in Alabama Prisons: 
Correctional Health Policy and Communicable Disease Control, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1220 
(2001); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Tuberculosis Outbreaks in Prison Housing Units for HIV-Infected Inmates—California, 1995–
1996, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 69, 79 (1999), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4804.pdf. 
 39. See Ricky N. Bluthenthal et al., Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs: HIV Risk 
Behaviors Among Injection Drug Users, 10 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 25 (1999); Ricky N. 
Bluthenthal et al., Drug Paraphernalia Laws and Injection-Related Infectious Disease Risk 
Among Drug Injectors, 29 J. DRUG ISSUES 1 (1999); Scott Burris et al., Addressing the “Risk 
Environment” for Injection Drug Users: The Mysterious Case of the Missing Cop, 82 MILBANK 
Q. 125 (2004); Kim Dovey et al., Safety Becomes Danger: Dilemmas of Drug-Use in Public 
Space, 7 HEALTH & PLACE 319 (2001); Samuel R. Friedman et al., Laws Prohibiting Over-the-
Counter Syringe Sales to Injection Drug Users: Relations to Population Density, HIV Prevalence, 
and HIV Incidence, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 791 (2001); Samuel R. Friedman et al., Relationships 
of Deterrence and Law Enforcement to Drug-Related Harms Among Drug Injectors in US 
Metropolitan Areas, 20 AIDS 93 (2006); Stephen K. Koester, Copping, Running, and 
Paraphernalia Laws: Contextual Variables and Needle Risk Behavior Among Injection Drug 
Users in Denver, 53 HUM. ORG. 287 (1994); Michael Marmor et al., Risk Factors for Infection 
with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Among Intravenous Drug Abusers in New York City, 1 
AIDS 39 (1987); Tim Rhodes et al., Situational Factors Influencing Drug Injecting, Risk 
Reduction and Syringe Exchange in Togliatti City, Russian Federation: A Qualitative Study of 
Micro Risk Environment, 57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 39 (2002). 
 40. See Crystal M. Fuller et al., Social Circumstances of Initiation of Injection Drug Use and 
Early Shooting Gallery Attendance: Implications for HIV Intervention Among Adolescent and 
Young Adult Injection Drug Users, 32 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 86 (2003); 
Marmor et al., supra note 39. 
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out of fear of legal consequences.41  Lack of proper syringe disposal facilities 
and legal disincentives to safe disposal increase the risk that used syringes will 
be improperly discarded, creating anxiety and some risk of accidental disease 
transmission among members of the general public.42 
Drug treatment for opioid dependence works, but getting people into drug 
treatment is a constant challenge.  People dependent on drugs first have to 
make a decision to seek treatment, and then there has to be a slot available.  
Because drug dependence is a chronic illness, relapse rates are high—even for 
users determined to quit.43  Given that people will continue to use drugs 
regardless of the law, improving syringe access and disposal, targeted 
outreach, overdose prevention, opiate replacement therapy, and easy access to 
drug treatment programs are essential to limiting the individual and social 
harms of illegal drug use.44 
B. Supervised Injection Facilities 
Municipalities bear the brunt of the human and financial costs associated 
with injection drug use and its collateral consequences.  In addition to the 
health and social challenges flowing from substance abuse, local governments 
must deal with the safety and security problems arising from the black market 
trade in illicit drugs.  It is not surprising, therefore, that in the United States the 
impetus for innovative programs to reduce the health consequences of illegal 
drug use—such as syringe exchange programs and drug overdose prevention 
interventions—tends to come from the local levels.45  From the perspective of 
 
 41. Karin E. Tobin et al., Calling Emergency Medical Services During Drug Overdose: An 
Examination of Individual, Social and Setting Correlates, 100 ADDICTION 397, 402–03 (2005); 
Melissa Tracy et al., Circumstances of Witnessed Drug Overdose in New York City: Implications 
for Intervention, 79 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 181, 183–85 (2005). 
 42. See sources cited supra note 34. 
 43. William A. Hunt et al., Relapse Rates in Addiction Programs, 27 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
455 (1971); see also M. Douglas Anglin et al., Drug Addiction and Treatment Careers Among 
Clients in the Drug Abuse Treatment Outcomes Study (DATOS), 11 PSYCHOL. ADDICTIVE 
BEHAV. 308 (1997). 
 44. See M. Connock et al., Methadone and Buprenorphine for the Management of Opioid 
Dependence: A Systematic Review and Economic Evaluation, HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT, Mar. 
2007, at 1, 61–62, available at http://www.hta.ac.uk/fullmono/mon1109.pdf; Richard H. Needle 
et al., Effectiveness of Community-Based Outreach in Preventing HIV/AIDS Among Injecting 
Drug Users, 16 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y S45 (2005); Alex Wodak & Annie Cooney, Effectiveness of 
Sterile Needle and Syringe Programmes, 16 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y S31 (2005). 
 45. See Scott Burris et al., The Legal Strategies Used in Operating Syringe Exchange 
Programs in the United States, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1161 (1996); Daliah I. Heller & Sharon 
Stancliff, Providing Naloxone to Substance Users for Secondary Administration to Reduce 
Overdose Mortality in New York City, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 393 (2007); Sarz Maxwell et al., 
Prescribing Naloxone to Actively Injecting Heroin Users: A Program to Reduce Heroin Overdose 
Deaths, 25 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 89 (2006); Karen H. Seal et al., Naloxone Distribution and 
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legal architecture, however, this apt civic experimentalism runs squarely into 
the limited control that cities, and even states, have over the policy framework 
for addressing illicit drug use and its collateral impact. 
The SIF question looks to be following the same pattern.  Recognizing the 
need among some IDUs for more intensive interventions,46 some thirty-eight 
cities across the globe have introduced facilities where drugs can be injected or 
otherwise consumed in a hygienic manner.47  An SIF is a place where IDUs 
inject drugs they obtain elsewhere under the supervision of healthcare 
providers.48  Facility staff members do not directly assist in injection, but are 
present to provide sterile injection supplies, answer questions on safe injection 
practices, administer first aid, and monitor for overdose.49  Importantly, SIF 
staff also offer general medical advice and referrals to drug treatment and other 
social support programs.50  In addition to reducing the health risks of drug use 
and serving as a bridge to treatment and other key services, SIFs are designed 
to reduce the externalities of public drug use in the communities they serve.51 
 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Training for Injection Drug Users to Prevent Heroin Overdose 
Death: A Pilot Intervention Study, 82 J. URB. HEALTH 303 (2005). 
 46. Kate Ksobiech, Beyond Needle Sharing: Meta-Analyses of Social Context Risk 
Behaviors of Injection Drug Users Attending Needle Exchange Programs, 41 SUBSTANCE USE & 
MISUSE 1379 (2006); see also Kora DeBeck et al., Public Injection Settings in Vancouver: 
Physical Environment, Social Context and Risk, 18 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 27 (2007). 
 47. DAGMAR HEDRICH, EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION, 
EUROPEAN REPORT ON DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS 19 (2004), available at www.emcdda. 
europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.AttachmentDownload&nNodeID=2944&slanguageISO=
EN; see also Thomas Kerr et al., Editorial, Drug Use Settings: An Emerging Focus for Research 
and Intervention, 18 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 1 (2007); Malkin, supra note 15. 
 48. Malkin, supra note 15, at 681–82. 
 49. Id. at 682, 692; Evan Wood et al., Service Uptake and Characteristics of Injection Drug 
Users Utilizing North America’s First Medically Supervised Safer Injecting Facility, 96 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 770, 770 (2006).  Most SIFs operate under the same general procedures.  IDUs 
must first register and provide written consent to participate.  See HEDRICH, supra note 47, at 10 
tbl.2, 13.  Facilities have different registration requirements.  Id. at 10.  Once an IDU has 
registered and entered the facility during its hours of operation, the IDU sits at a table, either 
alone or with other IDUs, and injects under the supervision of a health professional.  KATE 
DOLAN & ALEX WODAK, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, FINAL REPORT ON INJECTING ROOMS IN 
SWITZERLAND (1996), http://www.lindesmith.org/library/dolan2.cfm. The rooms are well-
stocked with sterile needles, cotton swabs, band aids, and other injection supplies.  Id.  SIF staff 
give advice on vein care and injection advice regarding, for example, the proper way to use a 
tourniquet.  See id.; Malkin, supra note 15, at 692.  In addition to providing guidance and 
emergency treatment in the case of overdose, staff also record and track a number of statistics, 
including the transmission of disease, the frequency of visits, and the number of medical and 
counseling referrals.  See DOLAN & WODAK, supra. 
 50. Nat M.J. Wright & Charlotte N.E. Tompkins, Supervised Injecting Centres, 328 BRIT. 
MED. J. 100, 100–01 (2004). 
 51. Robert S. Broadhead et al., Safer Injection Facilities in North America: Their Place in 
Public Policy and Health Initiatives, 32 J. DRUG ISSUES 329, 347–48 (2002); Benedikt Fischer et 
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Studies of existing SIFs have generally reported beneficial results for 
clients and positive or neutral results for the site neighborhood.52  Such 
facilities have been operating in Europe since the 1980s.  Reviews that collate 
available evidence report that SIFs have consistently led to less risky injection 
behavior and fewer overdose deaths among clients,53 increased client 
enrollment in drug treatment services, reduced nuisances associated with 
public injection, such as discarded needles and public intoxication,54 and saved 
public resources.55 
Perhaps most applicable to the U.S. context is the experience of SIFs in 
Australia and Canada.  In 2001, after several years of public deliberation and 
the closure of a short-lived illegal facility, a pilot program opened in Sydney, 
Australia.56  This facility functions under a license issued by the state 
government of New South Wales, not through national authorization.57  Soon 
after, in 2003, the Canadian federal government created a special carve-out in 
its drug laws to allow the experimental operation of a pilot SIF in Vancouver, 
British Columbia.58  There, too, there had been considerable debate about 
public health innovations coming in conflict with traditional drug enforcement 
strategies, since activists had for a time operated an unauthorized facility.59  
The debate in Canada recently went to court, where a decision by the Supreme 
 
al., Safer Injection Facilities (SIFs) for Injection Drug Users (IDUs) in Canada: A Review and 
Call for an Evidence-Focused Pilot Trial, 93 CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH 336 (2002); Craig L. Fry et 
al., Editorial, The Place of Supervised Injecting Facilities Within Harm Reduction: Evidence, 
Ethics and Policy, 101 ADDICTION 465 (2006). 
 52. See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 53. Demonstrating a community-level impact is difficult, however, because many programs 
have been “pilots” with limited coverage, sometimes operating under counterproductive 
regulations.  See generally  HEDRICH, supra note 47; JO KIMBER ET AL., NAT’L DRUG & 
ALCOHOL RESEARCH CTR. UNIV. OF N.S.W., INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF SUPERVISED 
INJECTING CENTRES (1999–2000) (2001); J. Kimber et al., Drug Consumption Facilities: An 
Update Since 2000, 22 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 227 (2003). 
 54. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Kerr et al., supra note 47; Dan Small, Commentary, Fools Rush in Where Angels 
Fear to Tread: Playing God with Vancouver’s Supervised Injection Facility in the Political 
Borderland, 18 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 18, 24 (2007). 
 56. MEDICALLY SUPERVISED INJECTION CTR. EVALUATION COMM., FINAL REPORT OF THE 
EVALUATION OF THE SYDNEY MEDICALLY SUPERVISED INJECTING CENTRE 3 (2003) [hereinafter 
MSIC EVALUATION COMM.]. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Evan Wood et al., Rationale for Evaluating North America’s First Medically Supervised 
Safer-Injecting Facility, 4 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 301, 301 (2004). 
 59. Alex Wodak et al., The Role of Civil Disobedience in Drug Policy Reform: How an 
Illegal Safer Injection Room Led to a Sanctioned, “Medically Supervised Injection Center,” 33 J. 
DRUG ISSUES 609 (2003); see also Small, supra note 55. 
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Court of British Columbia upheld the locally operated SIF against an effort by 
the federal government to close the facility.60  That decision is now on appeal. 
Both facilities have been extensively and carefully evaluated.  In 
epidemiological analyses of a large cohort of IDUs in Vancouver, SIF clients 
were less likely to reuse or share needles than non-clients.61  Compared with 
HIV-positive drug users not using the facility, infected clients were 
significantly less likely to lend their syringes to others.62  SIF clients used 
clean water for injection,63 filtered drugs prior to injecting,64 and injected in a 
clean location more frequently than non-clients.65  These and related evaluation 
data demonstrate marked reductions in risky practices, suggesting long-term 
public health benefits to the injectors as well as the community at large.66  In 
Sydney, 41% of SIF clients reported adopting at least one safer injection 
technique since using the facility.67  A series of three annual neighborhood 
surveys found that SIF clients were more likely to use new syringes than non-
clients and less likely to share injection equipment other than syringes.68 
Overdoses do occur in SIFs, shedding some light onto the rates of overdose 
among IDUs at large.69  In contrast with the troublingly high and rising 
numbers of fatal heroin-related overdose deaths in areas where heroin use is 
widespread,70 the controlled environment and the presence of medical 
 
 60. PHS Comty. Servs. v. Att’y Gen. Can., [2008] BCSC 661 (Can.); see infra note 188 and 
accompanying text. 
 61. Evan Wood et al., Summary of Findings from the Evaluation of a Pilot Medically 
Supervised Safer Injecting Facility, 175 CAN.  MED. ASS’N J. 1399, 1402 (2006), available at 
http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/175/11/1399 (reporting statistically significant differences 
between SIF clients and non-clients on this data point). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Thomas Kerr et al., A Micro-Environmental Intervention to Reduce the Harms 
Associated with Drug-Related Overdose: Evidence from the Evaluation of Vancouver’s Safer 
Injection Facility, 18 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 37, 41 (2007). 
 65. See Fry et al., supra note 51, at 465. 
 66. See Wood et al., supra note 61. 
 67. MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 56, at 95 tbl.5.5. 
 68. But see id. at 92–93 (noting that some of these differences were not statistically 
significant). 
 69. See, e.g., Wood et al., supra note 61, at 1402 (reporting a rate of approximately 1.3 
overdoses per 1000 injections). 
 70. See Darke & Zador, supra note 32 (reviewing international data on heroin overdose); 
Wayne Hall & Shane Darke, Trends in Opiate Overdose Deaths in Australia 1979–1995, 52 
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 71 (1998) (reviewing the same data for Australia); Leonard J. 
Paulozzi et al., Increasing Deaths from Opioid Analgesics in the United States, 15 
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 618, 624 (2006) (noting the role of heroin and other 
illicit drugs as a significant contributor to the growing number of fatal drug poisonings in the 
United States); Leonard J. Paulozzi, Opioid Analgesic Involvement in Drug Abuse Deaths in 
American Metropolitan Areas, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1755, 1755 (2006). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] FEDERALISM, POLICY LEARNING, AND LOCAL INNOVATION IN PUBLIC HEALTH 1103 
assistance account for the complete lack of any reported overdose deaths in 
any SIF.71  This data alone suggests overdose deaths are avoidable and that 
SIFs are—in this sense—a life-saving intervention for chronic IDUs. 
Many of the advocates opposing SIFs argue that, in condoning drug use, 
these facilities promote or at least enable continued addiction.  Evidence points 
toward the opposite result, however, suggesting that these programs provide a 
rare opportunity to engage hardcore users on a path to recovery.  Both the 
Sydney and Vancouver facilities proved to be effective gateways for addiction 
treatment, counseling, and other health and social services.72  By the third 
annual survey, Sydney SIF clients were significantly more likely to report 
starting drug treatment in the previous year than non-clients (38% versus 
21%).73  In Vancouver, SIF attendance and contact with an SIF addiction 
counselor were each associated with a greater willingness to enter a 
detoxification program.74 
Both the Vancouver and Sydney evaluations found some positive and no 
negative effects on the surrounding community.  In both cities, there was a 
significant reduction in observed instances of public injection in the 
neighborhood following the opening of the facility.75  The numbers of 
discarded syringes and the amount of injection-related litter in the vicinity of 
the program’s offices also declined substantially.76  In neither instance was 
there an increase in crime or drug dealing within a close radius of the facility.77  
A series of surveys in Sydney found that area residents and business owners 
reported a sustained decline in public injection and discarded syringes 
following the opening of the SIF.78  Overall, evaluators sought, but did not 
 
 71. Wood et al., supra note 61, at 1402–03; see also MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 
56, at 59; Thomas Kerr et al., Drug-Related Overdoses Within a Medically Supervised Safer 
Injection Facility, 17 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 436, 438 (2006); Kerr et al., supra note 64, at 42; 
Wright & Tompkins, supra note 50, at 101. 
 72. See MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 56, at 207; Wood et al., supra note 61, at 
1403. 
 73. MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 56, at 98. 
 74. See Evan Wood et al., Attendance at Supervised Injecting Facilities and Use of 
Detoxification Services, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2512, 2513 (2006). 
 75. MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 56, at 102; Wood, et al., supra note 61, at 1401. 
 76. Wood et al., supra note 61, at 1401. 
 77. Id.; MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 56, at 102; see also Karen Freeman et al., 
The Impact of the Sydney Medically Supervised Injecting Centre (MSIC) on Crime, 24 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL REV. 173 (2005) (noting that, although no crime increase occurred in Sydney, there 
was a slight increase in the level of loitering around the SIF). 
 78. MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 56, at 109–13; see also Evan Wood et al., 
Changes in Public Order After the Opening of a Medically Supervised Safer Injecting Facility for 
Illicit Injection Drug Users, 171 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 731, 733 (2004) (finding similar results 
following the opening of the SIF in Vancouver). 
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find, any evidence that the SIFs had encouraged new drug use or discouraged 
its cessation.79 
As they provide a mechanism for functionally addressing long-standing 
public health problems, SIFs may save public funds by preventing death, 
disease, and crime.  Fiscal benefits in the form of lower ambulance and 
hospital utilization may be significant given the evidence that SIFs prevent 
wound infections and successfully treat large numbers of overdoses on-site.80  
Moreover, SIFs generally attract the most disorganized individuals with the 
most chronic public injection habits and an above-average risk for infections 
and overdose.  In this respect, the SIF arguably falls into an emerging category 
of social interventions that adopt a “power law” or Pareto conception of the 
distribution of social costs.81  Rather than positing a “normal,” or bell-curve, 
distribution of social costs among drug users, the power-law approach posits 
that a relatively small proportion of individuals account for the large majority 
of the social costs.82  On this view, investing in extra services for this 
population, even expensive extra services, can actually produce a substantial 
net savings in social service and health care expenditures.83 
 
 79. See MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 56, at 39; Wood et al., supra note 61, at 
1401. 
 80. See HEDRICH, supra note 47, at 50, 55–56; MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 56, 
at 186–87; see also Ahmed M. Bayoumi & Gregory S. Zaric, The Cost-Effectiveness of 
Vancouver’s Supervised Injection Facility, 179 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1143, 1143 (2008) 
(projecting that, even according to the most conservative estimates, the Vancouver SIF will save 
the Canadian taxpayer over 14 million Canadian dollars over the next decade). 
 81. See Gladwell, supra note 12, at 98–99 (discussing the power law concept in the context 
of homelessness). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. at 97–99.  Gladwell describes the experiences of two police officers in Reno, 
Nevada, who spend at least half their time dealing with homeless individuals and who decided to 
see how expensive some of the individuals they most frequently assisted were in terms of public 
expenditures: 
When someone passed out on the street, there was a “One down” call to the paramedics.  
There were four people in an ambulance, and the patient sometimes stayed at the hospital 
for days, because living on the streets in a state of almost constant intoxication was a 
reliable way of getting sick.  None of that, surely, could be cheap. 
  [The officers] called someone they knew at an ambulance service and then contacted 
the local hospitals.  “We came up with three names that were some of our chronic 
inebriates in the downtown area, that got arrested the most often,” [Officer] O’Bryan said.  
“We tracked those three individuals through just one of our two hospitals.  One of the 
guys had been in jail previously, so he’d only been on the streets for six months.  In those 
six months, he had accumulated a bill of a hundred thousand dollars—and that’s at the 
smaller of the two hospitals near downtown Reno.  It’s pretty reasonable to assume that 
the other hospital had an even larger bill.  Another individual came from Portland and had 
been in Reno for three months.  In those three months, he had accumulated a bill for sixty-
five thousand dollars.  The third individual actually had some periods of being sober, and 
had accumulated a bill of fifty thousand.” 
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II.  STATE AUTHORITY TO CREATE AN SIF 
Authorization of an SIF is, legally if not politically, the easy part.  States 
have the authority to regulate a vast spectrum of activity within their borders.  
This authority, called the “police power,” predates the founding of the nation84 
and has remained one of the central features of our federal system.  State 
regulation of public health is perhaps the classic example of state police 
power,85 with continuing practical and philosophical importance.86  The police 
power certainly encompasses a wide range of measures to control drug 
dependency and misuse.87  The authority for state police power is enshrined in 
 
Id. at 97; see also Dennis P. Culhane et al., Testing a Typology of Family Homelessness Based on 
Patterns of Public Shelter Utilization in Four U.S. Jurisdictions: Implications for Policy and 
Program Planning, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 1 (2007).  It must be noted, however, that the 
economic analysis of SIF costs and benefits has yet to produce definitive findings.  See HEDRICH, 
supra note 47, at 28; MSIC EVALUATION COMM., supra note 56, at 195–99; Kerr et al., supra 
note 47, at 2. 
 84. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 26–27, 205, 
211 (2000) (noting that states and municipalities handled disease outbreaks and other public 
health issues in the colonial period and that by the time the states joined together under the 
Constitution, local governments and states had become proficient in handling these issues, which 
the Constitution recognized by creating a federal government of limited powers and by not 
enumerating a specific federal interest in public health). 
 85. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (declaring that the state 
police power is an “immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory 
of a State, not surrendered to the general government: . . . [i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, 
health laws of every description, . . . are component parts of this mass”). 
 86. See generally PARMET, supra note 5 (describing the central place of public health in U.S. 
constitutional order). 
 87. See, for example, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), stating: 
  The broad power of a State to regulate the narcotic drugs traffic within its borders is 
not here in issue.  More than forty years ago, in Whipple v. Martinson, this Court 
explicitly recognized the validity of that power: “There can be no question of the authority 
of the State in the exercise of its police power to regulate the administration, sale, 
prescription and use of dangerous and habit-forming drugs . . . .  The right to exercise this 
power is so manifest in the interest of the public health and welfare, that it is unnecessary 
to enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too firmly established to be 
successfully called in question.” 
  Such regulation, it can be assumed, could take a variety of valid forms.  A State 
might impose criminal sanctions, for example, against the unauthorized manufacture, 
prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics within its borders.  In the interest 
of discouraging the violation of such laws, or in the interest of the general health or 
welfare of its inhabitants, a State might establish a program of compulsory treatment for 
those addicted to narcotics.  Such a program of treatment might require periods of 
involuntary confinement.  And penal sanctions might be imposed for failure to comply 
with established compulsory treatment procedures.  Or a State might choose to attack the 
evils of narcotics traffic on broader fronts also—through public health education, for 
example, or by efforts to ameliorate the economic and social conditions under which those 
evils might be thought to flourish.  In short, the range of valid choice which a State might 
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the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states all powers that are neither 
prohibited by the Constitution nor granted under the Constitution to the federal 
government.88 
Given the evidence discussed in Part I, a state could view an SIF as a 
reasonable  public health measure with the potential to address a host of 
stubborn and costly problems by decreasing the individual and communal 
harms associated with public injection drug use.  Authorizing an SIF would 
therefore be a logical and prudent exercise of the police power.89  This 
authority could be invoked through a variety of mechanisms that we briefly 
canvass in this part.90 
A. Legislative Authorization 
There is no question that state legislatures have the power to modify state 
law to explicitly remove legal impediments to SIF operation that might exist 
under state law.  Where such impediments are present, explicit authorization 
by a state legislature is, in the absence of positive action at the federal level, 
the optimal method of SIF authorization.  Properly drafted state legislative 
authorization would eliminate uncertainty about the legality of the facility 
under potentially conflicting state laws and provide the SIF operators and 
 
make in this area is undoubtedly a wide one, and the wisdom of any particular choice 
within the allowable spectrum is not for us to decide. 
Id. at 664–65 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. X; GOSTIN, supra note 84, at 26–27, 48. 
 89. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).  This is not to say that no federal 
law affects state-authorized SIFs, only that states are not prevented from authorizing an SIF as an 
initial matter.  This is a fine and potentially confusing distinction, which is best illustrated by the 
instance of medical marijuana regulation in California, discussed briefly in Part III.A.  California 
was able to authorize the use of marijuana for medical purposes under its state police powers 
because the power to legalize or prohibit activities with controlled substances is neither delegated 
to the federal government as an enumerated provision of the Constitution, nor prohibited to the 
states in a provision of the Constitution or in a federal statute.  Whether states have the authority 
under their police powers to authorize an SIF (the question answered in this section) is a different 
question than the question we take up in Part III: Whether a federal challenge to a state acting 
within its police powers should be upheld as a matter of conflicting state and federal laws? 
 90. We have chosen to focus on state authorization because federal authorization of an SIF is 
currently unlikely due to prevailing socio-political realities surrounding drug use in national 
policy circles.  Should circumstances change, authorization options at the federal level would 
closely follow the methods discussed in this part.  Further, the Attorney General could 
promulgate a regulation under the CSA, carving out special exemptions for the staff, 
management, and clients enrolled in the facility.  See 21 U.S.C. § 871(b) (2006). This would 
support a policy directive for federal law enforcement agents to abstain from persecuting clientele 
while on premises (and perhaps, even en route) to SIF programs.  Finally, the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General could approve an exemption 
scheme applicable to pilot SIF programs under the provision of the CSA authorizing research.  
See 21 U.S.C. § 872(e). 
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clients with protection against informal police pressure or other interference.91  
The legislative process also affords an opportunity for SIF proponents to place 
the evidence in favor of such facilities on the public record and to address the 
concerns of dissenters and community stakeholders.  In addition, legislative 
authorization would also insulate an SIF from community challenges based on 
nuisance92 or other land-use laws.93  Finally, state legislative authorization puts 
the SIF on its strongest footing against a challenge from the federal 
government. 
Legislative authorization of an SIF would surely generate lively debate, but 
state legislation establishing politically controversial public health 
interventions at odds with federal drug policy is not unprecedented.  
Furthermore, there is no doctrinal barrier to states authorizing activity under 
state law that is prohibited under federal law or disfavored by federal 
policymakers.  Since 1996, four state legislatures have enacted laws permitting 
the use of medicinal marijuana, a Schedule I drug under federal law, by 
qualified patients.94  Since the beginning of the HIV epidemic, seventeen states 
have passed laws expressly authorizing syringe exchange programs (SEPs), 
over-the-counter (OTC) syringe sales, or both.95 
It is also within the authority of many municipal legislatures to authorize 
an SIF.  City and county governments bear the brunt of the burden of service 
 
 91. However, an explicit police order based on administrative state authorization of a syringe 
exchange program (SEP) was not enough to control street-level action against SEPs by New York 
City police.  Roe v. City of New York, 232 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244–45, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
Ultimately, litigation and an injunction were needed.  See id. at 260 (forbidding police 
interference with SEPs). 
 92. Legislative authorization would provide a strong legal bulwark against so-called “Not In 
My Back Yard (NIMBY) actions,” which are often predicated on public nuisance grounds.  For 
example, New York nuisance law prohibits activity that either unreasonably endangers the safety 
of others or involves a property being used for unlawful conduct.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 
(McKinney 2008).  However, if the state authorized an SIF, the employees and the IDUs would 
not be engaging in “unlawful conduct” and the premises would not be maintained for the purpose 
of engaging in unlawful conduct. 
 93. Real Property Law often provides the statutory authority to void leases and remove 
tenants and owners who use their residences for proscribed activities.  See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. 
LAW § 231(1) (McKinney 2006) (stating that leases may be voided if the premises are used for 
illegal trade or illegal activity); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1979) (“An 
owner or tenant . . . of any premises . . . used . . . for purposes of . . . any illegal trade, business 
. . . [may be removed].”).  State authorization of an SIF would render these types of provisions 
inapplicable by establishing the SIF as lawful under state law. 
 94. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: HOW TO 
REMOVE THE THREAT OF ARREST 11 (2007), available at http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/ 
general/SBSR_2007.pdf. 
 95. Scott Burris et al., The Project on Harm Reduction in the Health Care System: Non-
Prescription Access to Sterile Syringes, http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/phrhcs/otc.htm (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2009). 
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delivery and emergency response to drug abuse and may be best able to judge 
the necessity and effectiveness of locally implemented interventions.96  They 
may therefore be willing to take legislative initiatives to combat the public 
health threat of public injection.  In fact, health leaders in several U.S. cities 
have already expressed interest in operating SIFs.97  Local authorization has 
advantages, clustered around the fact that there may be greater cultural and 
political homogeneity relative to the intervention, but local authorization is 
necessarily mediated by political decisions at the state and national level, the 
varying authority granted to municipalities to legislate in the arena of public 
health, and the vagaries of state drug law. 
Most local governments have been delegated some police power to protect 
public health,98 and have the discretion to implement programs that are 
supported by reasonable evidence of efficacy in combating health threats.99  In 
a locality with such power, a city’s legislature (such as a city council) could 
enact an ordinance to create an SIF.  Such a move would fit squarely within a 
strong tradition of local policy innovation as it has flourished in the realms of 
public health (e.g. smoking bans),100 environmental protection (e.g. recycling 
 
 96. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 256–57 
(2004). 
 97. See supra note 16. 
 98. Typical of legislation delegating such authority is Pennsylvania’s First Class City Home 
Rule Act, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13131 (West 1998) (granting qualified cities authority of 
local self-government, including “complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to 
its municipal functions”) and its enabling legislation, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2961 (West 
1997), providing that “[a]ll grants of municipal power to municipalities governed by a home rule 
charter under this subchapter, whether in the form of specific enumeration or general terms, shall 
be liberally construed in favor of the municipality.” 
 99. See C. DALLAS SANDS ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 14.19, at 102–03 (2001).  
Over the course of the last century the level of autonomy granted to local entities has steadily 
increased.  Local governmental power has been viewed since the 1860s through the prism of 
Dillon’s Rule, which holds that local power is very narrow and absolutely limited by state 
authority.  See City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, 24 Iowa 455, 478–80 (1868) (establishing the 
“Rule” in a decision by John Forrest Dillon); David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: 
Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 506–09 (1999).  The alternative to 
Dillon’s Rule is home rule, in which states transfer many powers of self-rule to localities.  See 
Briffault, supra note 96, at 257.  Home Rule localities have been steadily increasing in recent 
decades.  See John E. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic 
Approach, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 75 & n.323 (1984).  Many localities with concentrated 
injection drug use populations are large metropolitan areas, which are now typically home rule 
entities that enjoy broad powers to regulate within their boundaries. 
 100. See M.L. Nixon et al., Tobacco Industry Litigation to Deter Local Public Health 
Ordinances: The Industry Usually Loses in Court, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 65, 66-68 (2004) 
(suggesting that local innovation on regulation of smoking in public venues has been relatively 
successful in defeating industry challenges that are based on state preemption grounds (winning 
in 60% of the cases surveyed), moving the national agenda on that issue as a result). 
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programs, carbon off-set markets),101 and civil rights (e.g. partner benefits for 
gay and lesbian couples).102 
However, while local innovation is an important facet of American 
policy,103 the authority of localities is limited in comparison with that of 
states.104  A locally-authorized SIF would be open to claims that it conflicted 
with—or was preempted by—state law.  For example, Atlantic City, New 
Jersey’s effort to implement an SEP by local ordinance without state 
authorization was successfully challenged in court by the local state 
prosecutor, who argued that it was prohibited by state drug law.105  To be 
effective in practice, a local government would have to establish that an SIF 
did not violate any state laws, or have a reliable expectation of non-
enforcement where it was arguably in violation. 
B. Administrative Authorization 
An SIF might also be authorized through administrative action, which can 
take a number of forms, including executive orders from state governors, rules 
and regulations from specialized state agencies like departments of health, and 
actions by local health agencies. 
 
 101. Several city-based environmental innovations have recently developed, including “green 
alleys” in Chicago, see Clay Risen, Cool Alleys, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 20, 2008, at 50, and a 
municipal carbon off-set trading scheme in San Francisco, see Dashka Slater, Working Offsets, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 20, 2008, at 50. 
 102. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the City Att’y of S.F., Decisive Win for Equal 
Benefits: San Francisco’s Landmark Equal Benefits Ordinance Is Upheld in U.S. Court of 
Appeals (July 29, 2003) (on file with Saint Louis University Law Journal) (“In 1997, San 
Francisco became the first jurisdiction in the country to require employers with city contracts to 
offer equal benefits to their employees’ domestic partners.  Since then, five other localities have 
followed suit: Los Angeles; Seattle; Berkeley, Calif.; San Mateo County, Calif.; and Tumwater, 
Wash.”). 
 103. The role of states in such regulation is widely heralded, but localities—especially home-
rule entities—take an increasingly avant-garde role in policy innovation.  See generally Paul 
Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2007) (“These examples illustrate a 
widespread pattern of policy innovation: a policy first embraced by a city proves itself 
manageable and popular at the local level before percolating ‘out’ to other cities and ‘up’ to the 
state level.  Without the possibility of city experimentation, these policies might have never been 
embraced by other jurisdictions.”). 
 104. The United States Constitution makes no reference to localities, and courts tend to 
interpret grants of local power narrowly, focusing instead on the expansive authority of states to 
pursue their sovereign goals.  Briffault, supra note 96, at 257, 264. 
 105. State v. City of Atlantic City, 879 A.2d 1206, 1207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(finding that an Atlantic City ordinance establishing a needle exchange program, under which 
municipal officials are authorized to distribute sterile hypodermic syringes to drug addicts for use 
in injecting drugs, conflicts with and therefore, is pre-empted by “the provisions of the Code of 
Criminal Justice that prohibit persons from using or assisting others in using controlled dangerous 
substances”). 
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Although the scope of their power varies, health agencies in all states have 
rule-making authority to protect public health, and often have the authority 
under their general authorizing legislation to undertake interventions necessary 
to protect public health.106  Demonstrating the need for and defining the terms 
of an SIF would be well within the traditional policy competencies of a health 
department.107  Moreover, in some states, Health Commissioners have the 
discretion to authorize activity related to controlled substances that is 
otherwise prohibited under state penal law, a particularly useful authority to 
have in establishing a facility hosting illegal drug injection.108 
State governors often have the authority to issue orders authorizing a range 
of activities within the general competence of the Executive Branch.109  
Authorization of an SIF under an executive order would carry some political 
weight, but such an authorization would also be subject to attack from 
numerous angles.  Executive authority to alter criminal codes is generally 
narrow, so any executive order purporting to authorize the use or possession of 
controlled substances could be challenged as exceeding the executive’s 
authority.110  More broadly, such action could be portrayed as an illegitimate 
 
 106. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:1A-7 (West 2007); see also ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, 
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 3.2.3, at 70–71 (1986).  In some states, administrative 
authorization will have to navigate state laws regulating controlled substances.  For example, the 
New York Controlled Substances Act (NYCSA) prohibits certain activities related to controlled 
substances.  N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3301(a) (McKinney 2002).  However, the NYCSA 
contemplates a role for the health commissioner in determining what activities should be 
proscribed.  Id. § 3308(2).  The Commissioner also plays an important role in promoting the 
medically legitimate use of controlled substances under section 3300-a of the NYCSA, which 
permits the state health authority to facilitate appropriate healthcare and research with controlled 
substances.  See id. § 3325(1).  In addition, the Commissioner has general discretion to create 
regulations “which in his judgment may be necessary or proper” to furtherance of health 
objectives.  Id. § 3308(2).  See generally Gostin et al., supra note 4, at 101–18 (describing state 
health powers). 
 107. For example, in New York, a Health Commissioner must be a physician with extensive 
practical experience.  N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 203 (“The commissioner shall be a physician, a 
graduate of an incorporated college, of at least ten years’ experience in the actual practice of his 
profession, and of skill and experience in public health duties and sanitary science.”). 
 108. This was the case in New York when a district court held that administrative 
authorization of an SEP and formal police policies recognizing the SEP created immunity for 
IDUs participating in the authorized SEPs.  See L.B. v. Town of Chester, 232 F. Supp. 2d 227, 
234 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Once an individual is authorized by the Commissioner, that ends their 
liability as an ‘unlawful’ possessor under the Penal Law [proscribing possession of controlled 
substances].”). 
 109. See Michael S. Herman, Gubernatorial Executive Orders, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 987 (1999) 
(examining executive order power in New Jersey); see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:215 
(Supp. 2008). 
 110. Such an objection was successfully raised in 2004 when the governor of New Jersey 
attempted to authorize SEPs through an executive order.  See Letter from Albert Porroni, 
Legislative Counsel, N.J. Office of Legislative Servs., to Assemb. Joseph Pennachio (Nov. 15, 
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usurpation of legislative authority.  However, if unchallenged or upheld, the 
effect of an executive authorization would be much the same as state 
legislative action. 
Local executives and administrative agencies such as health departments 
often have significant independent regulatory power.  SEPs authorized by local 
government executives or boards of health have successfully operated in 
several cities in Pennsylvania, California, and Ohio, without state 
authorization.111  However, where it is accomplished by executive or 
regulatory action, local authorization would face even bigger obstacles if 
formally challenged than would the legislative mechanisms discussed in 
Section A above.112  Administrative authorization at the city level can even be 
problematic with respect to other city agencies.  In the case of Philadelphia’s 
SEP, authorized by mayoral order and Board of Health declaration, the legal 
vulnerability of the operation has often made it harder to deal with cases of 
police interference with sites or clients.113 
C. Authorization by Referendum 
Finally, twenty-four states have a ballot initiative mechanism which 
provides a framework for state-wide referenda on specific policy 
propositions.114  By putting important policy questions directly before the 
voters, this system of direct democracy allows voters to circumvent the normal 
political process and (to some degree) the influence of special interests in 
electoral politics.  For example, in 1996, Californians passed Proposition 215, 
authorizing the implementation of the state’s Compassionate Use Act 
(CUA).115  By creating a medical carve-out of state drug laws, this law 
decriminalized the possession and use of marijuana for medical purposes in the 
 
2004), available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/ols/ols20041115.html (regarding Govenor 
McGreevey’s Executive Order No. 139). 
 111. See Burris et al., supra note 45, at 1162 tbl.1. 
 112. For example, a local prosecutor or police agency may feel even less bound by a health 
department or mayoral directive than by action by the local legislative body.  Although this is not 
a legal distinction, it is an important political consideration. 
 113. See Corey S. Davis et al., Effects of an Intensive Street-Level Police Intervention on 
Syringe Exchange Program Use in Philadelphia, Pa, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 233 (2005); Kumi 
Smith, Effects of Deregulation of Syringe Access Laws on HIV Transmission and Implications for 
Global Implementation of Syringe Exchange Programs, 8 J. INT’L POL’Y SOLUTIONS 31, 32 
(2008). 
 114. Initiative & Referendum Inst., Univ. of S. Cal., State-by-State List of Initiative and 
Referendum Provisions, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i&r.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 
2009). 
 115. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 
2009).  See generally Samuels, supra note 19, at 49 (discussing Proposition 215 in relation to the 
legalization of medical marijuana). 
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state.116  An additional seven states have enacted effective medical marijuana 
laws through ballot initiative since 1996.117 
Such governance innovations foster vitality, heterogeneity, and 
experimentation on issues where the lack of political will has stifled more 
sober and evidence-driven approaches to policy reform.  If voters in ballot 
initiative states supported a similar carve-out for an SIF to operate in their 
state, this mechanism could provide a way to circumvent the lack of political 
will for nuanced drug policy among elected officials.  Since such initiatives 
create or modify state law, they have the same legal effect as legislative action. 
III.  FEDERAL OPPOSITION TO A STATE-AUTHORIZED SIF 
A state can certainly authorize an SIF.  The main legal and political 
question is whether the administration then in power in Washington would 
attempt to prohibit such a facility from opening or operating.118  No federal law 
prohibits an SIF in so many words, but as with medical marijuana and 
physician-assisted suicide, the Controlled Substances Act119 (CSA) would 
provide a basis for federal action against one.  In Section A, below, we put the 
current case in context by briefly explaining the statutory authority for federal 
drug control activities.  In Section B, we explain why federal drug possession 
laws are an unlikely avenue of federal enforcement against an SIF.  In Section 
C, we identify the so-called “Crack House Statute”120 as the federal drug law 
most likely to be invoked against an SIF, and provide a short legislative and 
judicial history of the provision.  In Section D, we discuss in detail the 
complex legal issues that would confront a court in applying the Crack House 
Statute to a state-authorized SIF.  Our discussion shows that, ex ante, states 
have a reasonable legal basis for proceeding with SIFs on the theory that they 
are not barred by federal law. 
 
 116. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 
 117. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 94, at 1. 
 118. The Bush Administration muscularly pursued an expansion of centralized, federal power 
and closely aligned with abstinence-only policy.  See, e.g., Mark Follman, Canada’s Safe Haven 
for Junkies, SALON.COM, Sept. 8, 2003, http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/09/08/ 
vancouver (“The prospect of government-backed hard-drug use next door has the White House 
palpably unsettled: As soon as Vancouver’s planned site gained Canadian federal approval in late 
June [of 2003], U.S. drug czar John Walters went off.  ‘It’s immoral to allow people to suffer and 
die from a disease we know how to treat,’ he told the Associated Press.  ‘There are no safe-
injection sites,’ he added, calling the policy ‘a lie’ and ‘state-sponsored personal suicide.’”).  As 
we discuss below, things could very well differ under President Barack Obama’s Administration.  
See infra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. 
 119. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006). 
 120. Id. § 856. 
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A. Federal Authority over Drug Policy: The Controlled Substances Act 
Prior to the 1970s, the federal government’s role in regulating illicit drug 
use, though significant, was modest in comparison to the present day.  As with 
other criminal and public health issues, for most of the country’s history, the 
regulation of controlled substances was accomplished primarily through state 
laws.121  The notion of a “War on Drugs” was first voiced by Richard Nixon 
(in fact, the Nixon Administration showed a strong commitment to drug 
treatment as a more important tool than incarceration for addressing drug 
problems).122  From the federal side, the new “war” was conducted through the 
rapid and expansive growth of federal criminal drug laws, including, most 
importantly, the enactment and subsequent amendment of the CSA123 in 1970 
and 1986, respectively. 
The CSA regulates a wide spectrum of drug-related activity.  Importantly 
for our analysis, however, the CSA does not displace the authority of states to 
regulate illicit drug use.124  Rather, the expansion of federal power over illicit 
drug control created a dual system of regulation, in which state and federal 
laws generally proscribe the same basic activities, such as drug possession and 
distribution.125  Federal law enforcement agencies like the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) do not have nearly enough resources to actually 
investigate and prosecute most federal offenses on a national basis.126  Instead, 
 
 121. Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law 
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1165–66 (1995) (“Early in United 
States history, most acts considered crimes were subject only to state criminal law.  Federal 
criminal laws were limited to areas in which the Constitution gave Congress specifically 
enumerated powers. . . .  Over time, Congress began to criminalize much ordinary criminal 
activity under the guise of regulating interstate commerce . . . .  With the Controlled Substances 
Act of 1970, however, Congress established virtually unlimited federal jurisdiction for all drug 
offenses as a way to protect public morals—without even the pretense of regulating interstate 
commerce.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 122. MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX 112 (1998). 
 123. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1236, amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 2307 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006)). 
 124. Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a, by contrast, 
the Federal Food and Drug Administration is the sole regulator of drugs marketed in the United 
States.  Id. § 335. 
 125. See Guerra, supra note 121, at 1164–65. 
 126. As a general matter, federal law enforcement agencies rarely prosecute individuals for 
simple possession.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl.33 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/table33_post.pdf 
(reporting that only 286 individuals (1.5% of all drug sentences) were sentenced for simple drug 
possession in fiscal year 2005).  Moreover, of those recorded sentences for simple possession, a 
large percentage involve individuals who were known to be trafficking drugs but, against whom, 
for any number of evidentiary or other reasons, only simple possession charges were made, or 
who pled to simple possession (and possibly cooperated with ongoing investigations) to avoid 
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the DEA and other federal agencies focus on major drug trafficking offenses 
and rely upon voluntary partnerships with state and local law enforcement 
agencies, which, usually under state law, handle the more routine policing of 
local drug markets and drug users. 
States are not required, however, to enforce federal drug laws.127  This 
policy structure has created the confounding situation with medical marijuana 
in California, which has recently been the subject of so much popular and 
scholarly interest.128  Today, close to 200,000 Californians have been granted 
prescriptions for medicinal marijuana that are authorized under California 
law,129  but which are prohibited under the CSA.130  Most, though not all, 
California police agencies follow the state law and decline to enforce the 
federal law.131  Because the DEA does not have nearly enough resources to 
 
conviction on more serious drug offenses.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE FEASIBILITY OF FEDERAL DRUG COURTS 16 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/ 
pdf/drug_court_study.pdf. 
 127. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933–35 (1997) (holding that states are 
not required to implement provisions of the Brady Act, a federal gun regulation statute, as being 
forced to do so would have been an unconstitutional act of commandeering state resources for 
federal regulation). 
 128. For example, this was a recent story featured prominently in The New Yorker magazine.  
Samuels, supra note 19, at 48. 
 129. See Letter from Jonathon K. Renner, Cal. Deputy Att’y Gen., for Bill Lockyer, Cal. 
Att’y Gen., to Robert D. Tousignant, Deputy Dir. & Chief Counsel, Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs. 
(July 15, 2005), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/CA_Attorney_General_ 
Letter.pdf (advising the Department of Health Services that “the implementation of a program 
required by Health and Safety Code section 11362.7 et seq. to provide medical marijuana 
identification cards for the purpose of facilitating the possession or cultivation of medical 
marijuana” does not “violate any federal criminal statute” even after Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 
1 (2005), a Supreme Court decision upholding federal action against medical marijuana users). 
 130. Samuels, supra note 19, at 50. 
 131. California police have recently been rebuffed in instances when they tried to enforce the 
federal prohibition of marijuana rather than acting consistently with the state-sanctioned scheme 
of medicinal marijuana.  City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) (holding that police must return marijuana seized in a traffic stop which was legally 
possessed under California state law over objections from local police that the return would 
constitute a crime under federal law); County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that California’s medicinal marijuana scheme is not 
preempted by federal law and consequently California localities and police may not rely on the 
federal law in refusing to adhere to the California scheme).  Although California police may 
continue to harass state citizens acting legitimately under the California medicinal marijuana 
scheme based on the belief that such interference is warranted by federal law, cf. Samuels, supra 
note 19, at 50, 57 (noting state police interference with the state sanctioned use of medical 
marijuana), California courts have recognized that California police need not—and in this 
instance, may not—enforce the broad federal prohibition against marijuana.  County of San 
Diego, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 482–83 (“Counties also appear to assert the identification card laws 
present a significant obstacle to the CSA because the bearer of an identification card will not be 
arrested by California’s law enforcement officers despite being in violation of the CSA.  
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investigate and prosecute a significant number of individual users of medical 
marijuana, and because the DEA apparently believes that prosecuting 
prescribing doctors would generate too much negative publicity, it has instead 
prosecuted marijuana growers, pressured landlords who provide space to 
cannabis buyers’ clubs, and made selective, high publicity raids on medicinal 
users.132 
There are at least two theories under which an SIF could be attacked as 
violating the CSA.  The first is that an SIF entails illegal possession of drugs 
not just by clients, but also by the operators and staff under the doctrine of 
“constructive possession.”  Possession laws arose in legal analysis of the SIFs 
in Canada and Australia but, for a variety of technical and practical reasons 
that we will briefly explore, these laws are unlikely to be the legal battleground 
in the United States.  We deem it is much more likely that federal officials 
would rely upon another section of the CSA, the Crack House Statute, whose 
history and applicability to SIFs will be discussed at length. 
B. Drug Possession 
Two federal provisions proscribe the unauthorized possession of controlled 
substances.  Theoretically, laws against possession would enable federal 
officials to prosecute every person who appeared at a clinic carrying pre-
obtained illegal drugs to inject.  Section 841(a)(1) makes it a crime for an 
unauthorized individual to “possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance.”133  Section 844 proscribes “simple 
 
However, the unstated predicate of this argument is that the federal government is entitled to 
conscript a state’s law enforcement officers into enforcing federal enactments, over the objection 
of that state . . . .  Th[is] argument falters on its own predicate because Congress does not have 
the authority to compel the states to direct their law enforcement personnel to enforce federal 
laws.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 5–7 (explaining how, after California approved by 
referendum the legalization of medical marijuana for strictly medical purposes, federal officers 
stormed the house of Diane Monson, a California resident who grew her own marijuana to treat a 
variety of serious medical conditions); Samuels, supra note 19, at 50, 56 (describing DEA 
enforcement techniques). 
 133. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006).  To convict an individual under § 841(a)(1), the 
government must prove (1) knowing, (2) unauthorized possession of a controlled substance, (3) 
with intent to distribute it.  United States v. Wright, 845 F. Supp. 1041, 1055 (D.N.J. 1994).  
Intent can be inferred from the amount of drugs recovered, even in the absence of other 
corroborating evidence.  United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 736–37 (8th Cir. 2002).  
However, § 841 would rarely be applicable to SIF clients, who normally would be carrying only a 
single dose.  See id. at 736 (“[P]ossession of only a small quantity of illegal drugs does not justify 
an inference of [intent to distribute].”).  Of course, an individual who tried to sell drugs within an 
SIF would be violating the facility’s rules and presumably could be prosecuted even if the legality 
of the SIF was unquestioned. 
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possession” without intent to distribute.134  Given the realities of DEA 
enforcement capacities and priorities, routine arrests at an SIF would be 
unusual, and in our assessment, unlikely.135 
It would be more efficient to target the operators of the SIF, on the theory 
that they were actually in possession of the drugs on-site, but this argument is 
legally quite weak.  SIF operators or staff never handle, hold, or control the 
drugs that clients bring in.  “Constructive” possession exists when 
circumstantial evidence establishes that an individual who is not actually in 
possession nonetheless has dominion and control over contraband.136  Mere 
association with those who possess drugs or mere presence near drugs is not 
enough to establish control.137  Rather, it must be shown that the defendant had 
some right, accepted by those within the particular setting, to possess the drugs 
at issue or to determine their disposition.138  SIF staff would make no such 
 
 134. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to 
possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid 
prescription or order, from a practitioner . . . .”). 
 135. It is perhaps instructive that federal officials have not attempted to use possession laws 
to discourage clients from using SEPs, even though § 844 would provide a basis for prosecuting 
IDUs who carry drugs or used needles (that often contain residue of illicit controlled substances) 
into needle exchanges.  Perhaps federal officials fear that using § 844 would be overturned by a 
court following the reasoning of similar challenges at the state level.  See, e.g., Roe v. City of 
New York, 232 F. Supp. 2d 240, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that “there is no criminal liability 
under [New York] Penal Law [prohibiting possession of controlled substances] for possession of 
. . . the drug residue remaining in a used needle or syringe” for an SEP participant); Doe v. 
Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 198 F.R.D. 325, 350 (D. Conn. 2001).  Or, the reluctance to invoke § 
844 against SEPs might simply result from an unwillingness to generate potentially 
overwhelmingly negative publicity. 
 136. United States v. Salinas-Salinas, 555 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Bethea, 442 F.2d 790, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  Control, in the context of constructive possession 
analysis, has been likened to the ability to “use and remove” controlled substances.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Schocket, 753 F.2d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. White, 660 F.2d 
1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Use of a portion of narcotics by a defendant is relevant . . . to the 
extent of his control over the larger quantity.”). 
 137. United States v. Rodriguez, 761 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Mere proximity to 
contraband, presence on property where it is found, and association with a person or persons 
having control of it are all insufficient to establish constructive possession.”). 
 138. United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he essential point 
[in determining constructive possession] is that the defendant have the ultimate control over the 
drugs.  He need not have them literally in his hands or on premises that he occupies but he must 
have the right (not the legal right, but the recognized authority in his criminal milieu) to possess 
them . . . .”); see also White, 660 F.2d at 1182 (noting that setting a schedule for sale of drugs 
provides supporting evidence of constructive possession).  Some courts have adopted the 
language of “joint venture” in determining when and if associated persons possess contraband.  
United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[C]onstructive possession may be 
demonstrated if the defendant . . . is a participant in a joint venture, thereby sharing dominion and 
control over the drug with the other participants.”). 
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claim as against drug users, and indeed would explicitly disclaim it; nor would 
clients continue to attend the SIF if their drugs were subject to confiscation.139  
In any event, there is no particular need for prosecutors to strain drug 
possession law to construct a case against an SIF operator: the act of providing 
a space for illegal drug use, broadly stated, is addressed explicitly in the Crack 
House Statute, to which we now turn. 
C. The Crack House Statute (§ 856): History 
During the explosion of public concern about crack cocaine use in the mid 
1980s, Congress added 21 U.S.C. § 856 to the CSA to enable prosecution of 
property owners who intentionally allowed their property to be used for the 
purpose of distributing or using drugs.140  In the words of one legislator, the so-
called Crack House Statute was created to “[o]utlaw[] operation of houses or 
buildings, so called ‘crack houses’, where ‘crack’, cocaine and other drugs are 
manufactured and used.”141  The statute itself was broadly drafted to prohibit 
managing, maintaining, or opening any place “for the purpose of unlawfully 
manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.”142 
 
 139. Using § 841(a)(1) would present the same problem on stilts.  Not only would it be 
necessary for federal prosecutors to show that the operator was able to exercise dominion and 
control over any drugs in the facility but also, in order to accumulate the required amount to 
support an inference of intent to distribute, United States v. Ramirez-Rodriguez, 552 F.2d 883, 
884 (9th Cir. 1977) (“It is well-established, that intent to distribute may in the proper 
circumstances be inferred from the amount seized.”), they would have to argue that the operator 
constructively possessed the aggregate amount of drugs that IDUs bring into the SIF.  This would 
be difficult.  First, larger quantities only create an inference of an intention to distribute or 
dispense; in the case of an SIF, such inferences could be easily rebutted.  Second, courts do not 
simply aggregate amounts of drugs held by various individuals or in various containers.  Rather, 
courts look at the totality of the circumstances to judge whether the drugs were intended for 
distribution, considering, for example, whether the drugs are packaged for sale.  See United States 
v. Hollman, 541 F.2d 196, 200 (8th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that many similar, individualized 
packages of drugs supported the inference of intent to distribute rather than personal use). 
 140. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2006); see also U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., FAQs About the 
Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ongoing/anti-proliferation_act.html 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2009). 
 141. 132 CONG. REC. 26,474 (1986) (excerpt of Senate Amendment No. 3034 to H.R. 5484, 
99th Cong. (1986)). 
 142. As originally enacted, the statute made it an offense to: 
(1) knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, 
or using any controlled substance; 
(2) manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner, lessee, agent, 
employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, or make available 
for use, with or without compensation, the building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of 
unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance. 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1841(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207–52. 
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The term “crack house” does not appear in the statute, though it tended to 
guide the initial interpretation of the statute by law enforcement agents as well 
as judges.  In one early decision interpreting the Crack House Statute, a court 
relied on a police officer’s definition of a crack house as: 
A crack house can be a house or an apartment that’s main purpose is used to 
ingest crack.  In these houses, the people who are crack users will come in just 
for the purpose of ingesting it. 
  Now in those houses . . . some small sales may also be made . . . .  [M]aybe 
20 or 30 people at a time . . . congregate and sit around and smoke the crack. 
  . . . [S]omebody in the kitchen might also be making some more crack, and 
also, if you go to one of the other rooms, there will be acts of prostitution also 
going on in there. 
  Also most of these houses are very dirty and unkempt, and if you have a 
crack house in your neighborhood, they aren’t very hard to spot at all, because 
you would just watch for a while, you’d notice activity going on by and around 
the house 24 hours a day, people going in and out 24 hours a day . . . .143 
And indeed, the Crack House Statute provided a powerful tool in the 1980s 
and early 1990s for combating these “drug dens.”144 
While § 856 was frequently and successfully used to target actual crack 
houses in its infancy,145 in time, the courts upheld the use of the statute in 
punishing the operators and owners of drug-involved places that did not fit into 
the stereotype of a crack house.  In these instances, courts inferred from the 
plain language of § 856 a purpose beyond eradicating crack houses: preventing 
a building from being used instrumentally in drug profiteering.146  For 
 
 143. United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1254 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 144. Michael V. Sachdev, The Party’s Over: Why the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act 
Abridges Economic Liberties, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 585, 588 (2004) (“[The Crack 
House Statute] had a fervent childhood, nailing a number of crack-cocaine distribution rings and 
detoxifying urban America by punishing absentee slumlords for allowing their blighted urban 
properties to become drug dens.” (citing Am. Council for Drug Educ., Basic Facts About Drugs: 
Cocaine, http://www.acde.org/common/Cocaine.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2009))). 
 145. Section 856 cases involving typical crack houses are straightforward and have generally 
involved residences or abandoned buildings that are being used for the sale, manufacture, or non-
recreational use of illicit drugs.  See e.g., United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 855–57 (5th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 295–97 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Cabbell, 
35 F.3d 1255, 1261–62 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Church, 970 F.2d 401, 405–06 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
 146. See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 230 F.3d 1224, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000) (defendant 
manufactured methamphetamine in his home); United States v. Moore, 184 F.3d 790, 792–93 
(8th Cir. 1999) (defendant unloaded drug shipments and used his home for storage facility in drug 
conspiracy); United States v. Bilis, 170 F.3d 88, 89–90 (1st Cir. 1999) (defendant bar owner 
purchased drugs and warned drug dealers of police surveillance); United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 
F.3d 340, 342–43 (5th Cir. 1997) (defendant handled money for drug-trafficking enterprise, 
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example, the statute was used against hotel owners who were knowingly 
renting rooms for drug sales, loaning money for drug purchases, and warning 
dealers of police presence;147 and against a car dealership owner selling 
cocaine out of his dealership.148  In the case of the car dealership, the court 
acknowledged that the establishment was not a “crack house” in the common 
sense of the term, but held that it fell within the plain language of the statute 
because the defendant was “manufacturing, storing, distributing or using a 
controlled substance” on the premises.149 
In time the fear of a crack epidemic was supplanted on the drug war 
agenda by a new source of panic: the use of “ecstasy” by young people at 
“rave” parties.  In 2002, then-Senator Joseph Biden introduced the Reducing 
Americans Vulnerability against Ecstasy Act (RAVE Act), which was, he 
explained, intended (in spite of the dramatic title) merely to accomplish a 
technical change to the Crack House Statute that would ensure that it could be 
applied to “rogue promoters” who were knowingly using property episodically 
or on a one-time basis for illegal drug purposes.150  Biden’s first bill 
succumbed to a groundswell of criticism over its name and its indiscriminate 
 
smuggled drugs, and provided her property for packaging); United States v. Cooper, 966 F.2d 
936, 937–39 (5th Cir. 1992) (defendant distributed crack out of his private club); Lancaster, 968 
F.2d at 1251–52 (defendant arranged for drug sales on his property); United States v. Clavis, 956 
F.2d 1079, 1083–84 (11th Cir. 1992) (defendant used his home for temporary storage of drugs 
and distribution to drug sellers); United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 772–73 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(defendant used car dealership for cocaine trafficking, used cocaine, and purchased cars for 
business with proceeds from illegal drug activity); United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 186 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (defendant motel owner alerted drug sellers of police presence, stored drugs on 
premises, and loaned money for the purchase of drugs for resale). 
 147. Chen, 913 F.2d at 186. 
 148. Tamez, 941 F.2d at 772–73. 
 149. Id. at 773. 
 150. 149 CONG. REC. 1846–47 (2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).  During the debate about the 
RAVE Act and in response to concerns about widening the traditional scope of § 856, Senator 
Biden stated: 
Our bill provides Federal prosecutors the tools needed to combat the manufacture, 
distribution or use of any controlled substance at any venue whose purpose is to engage in 
illegal narcotics activity.  Rather than create a new law, our bill merely amends a well-
established statute to make clear that anyone who knowingly and intentionally uses their 
property, or allows another person to use their property, for the purpose of distributing or 
manufacturing or using illegal drugs can be held accountable, regardless of whether the 
drug use is ongoing or occurs at a single event . . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . .  The purpose of my legislation is not to prosecute legitimate, law-abiding 
managers of stadiums, arenas, performing arts centers, licensed beverage facilities and 
other venues because of incidental drug use at their events . . . .  My bill would help in the 
prosecution of rogue promoters who not only know that there is drug use at their event but 
also hold the event for the purpose of illegal drug use or distribution. 
Id. 
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demonization of raves,151 but then he successfully inserted the same statutory 
language, sans the inflammatory title, in a larger bill.152  The amendments 
brought within the Crack House Statute’s coverage occasional property users, 
but did not change its focus: the manufacture, distribution, or use of any 
controlled substance at any venue whose purpose is to engage in illegal 
narcotics activity.153  The 2003 amendments reaffirmed the dual historical and 
legislative purpose of the Crack House Statute in targeting places that are 
maintained for illegal drug use and striking at those who profit from such 
places. 
D.  Applying the Crack House Statute (§ 856) to an SIF: Statutory and 
Constitutional Complexities 
Federal opponents of an SIF would surely seek to cast its illegality as a 
simple case.  Unlike other health facilities, SIFs host illegal drug use, which 
Congress plainly and intentionally prohibited in § 856.  The argument has the 
virtue of simplicity, but not of analytic rigor, and its force diminishes steadily 
as one acknowledges the legitimate medical purposes animating the SIF, and 
the reasonableness of a government decision to sponsor the intervention in 
light of the evidence available today.  The CSA is concerned with health and 
health care, not just the control of illicit drug use, and it explicitly respects the 
state role in crafting drug-related policy.154  Indeed, a decision by the federal 
government to use the CSA to shut down so reasonable an exercise of the 
police power would afford the Supreme Court an interesting opportunity to set 
a clear outer bound on the Commerce power. 
 
 151. Sachdev, supra note 144, at 587. 
 152. Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 608, 117 Stat. 650, 691 
(2003) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2006)); see also Sachdev, supra note 144, at 595 
& n.68 (discussing the passage of the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act within the Amber Alert 
Bill). 
 153. The amendments altered the original statute as follows: 
(1) knowingly open or maintain any place open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, 
whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or 
using any controlled substance; 
(2) manage or control any building, room, or enclosure place, whether permanently or 
temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and 
knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from,  or make available for use, with or 
without compensation, the building, room, or enclosure  place for the purpose of 
unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance. 
§ 608(b), 117 Stat. at 691. 
 154. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2006). 
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1. Construing the Crack House Statute 
The current version of § 856(a) makes it illegal, “except as authorized by 
this subchapter,” to: 
(1) knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, whether 
permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or 
using any controlled substance; 
(2) manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as 
an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and 
intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or without 
compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, 
distributing, or using a controlled substance.155 
It is not perfectly clear, as a threshold matter, which section would apply to 
the sort of SIF we hypothesize.  Many courts have grappled with distinguishing 
and defining the provisions, their relationship,156 and the degree to which the 
provisions can simultaneously apply.157  Some have read the two subsections 
as effectively prohibiting the same general activity, except that subsection 
(a)(2) requires the additional element of having made the premises available to 
others.158  Other courts have reasoned that the provisions prohibit the same 
activity, just by different actors.159  The most common interpretation of the two 
provisions—and the one that now appears to be prevailing—is that subsection 
(a)(1) is aimed at those individuals who own and operate crack houses and 
subsection (a)(2) is aimed at those individuals who may not have opened or 
maintained the premises, but who knowingly allowed others to make the 
premises available for illegal purposes.160  For reasons that we hope will 
become clear, there is a reasonable basis for the position that § 856 does not 
bar a state-authorized SIF regardless of which subsection comes into play.  We 
 
 155. Id. § 856(a). 
 156. There has been some confusion about the extent to which the two provisions differ.  
Richard Belfiore, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal “Crack-House 
Statute” Criminalizing Maintaining Place for Purpose of Making, Distributing, or Using 
Controlled Drugs (21 USCS § 856), 116 A.L.R. Fed. 345 (1993 & Supp. 2008–2009). 
 157. See id.  (discussing decisions holding that § 856(a)(1) and (a)(2) are duplicative and 
therefore, the convictions to the lesser included offenses must be vacated). 
 158. See e.g., United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1507 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
although subsection (a)(2) requires an additional element—making the premises available to 
others—the offenses are multiplicitous, and thus, in instances where a defendant is charged with 
both subsections, the subsection (a)(1) charge should be dismissed as the lesser-included offense). 
 159. United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that subsection (a)(1) 
applies to lessees or people who actively maintain a place for the proscribed activity while 
subsection (a)(2) applies to lessors or a person “who has knowingly allowed others to engage in 
those activities by making the place ‘available for use . . . for the purpose of unlawfully’ engaging 
in such activity” (alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 856 (a)(2))). 
 160. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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assume for the following discussion that a state has undertaken to operate the 
SIF itself, on its own premises, and that a challenge would be raised under 
subsection (a)(1).  We also assume, for narrative convenience, that adverse 
federal action would be initiated by the Attorney General.  This adverse action 
could take the form of an injunction proceeding, criminal indictments referred 
through the corresponding U.S. Attorney’s Office, 161 or an action to strip the 
licenses of SIF operators.  We view this last option as the least likely in light of 
precedent discussed below.162 
Courts have applied § 856 to a wide variety of places163 that have been 
used for illegal drug activity.164  The argument that an SIF should likewise be 
 
 161. The Attorney General has the authority to initiate injunction proceedings against persons 
deemed to be in violation of § 856 and other provisions of the subchapter.  21 U.S.C. § 882 
(2006).  In trials concerning alleged violations of injunctions, defendants are statutorily entitled to 
trial by jury.  Id. § 882(b).  Jury trials are of course provided in federal criminal actions of the 
type that would result from prosecution under the Crack House Statute.  This is perhaps as good 
an opportunity as any to recall the potential impact of jury nullification.  Given the sharp 
disconnect between the legislative intent of § 856 and its potential use in prosecuting state actors 
working in good faith for betterment of public health, jury nullification could possibly provide 
some political cover to federal officials who feel compelled to honor the culture of prohibitionist 
absolutism.  This is, however, ultimately a thin reed to rely on for front-line SIF operators facing 
potentially severe penalties, notwithstanding the resurgence of jury nullification in popular and 
scholarly circles.  See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room 
and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 434–35, 448 (1998) (discussing the 
nullification advocacy and moderately increased academic support for jury nullification). 
 162. For a discussion of Gonzales v. Oregon, see infra Part III.D.2.  It is difficult to see how 
the Supreme Court could allow the Attorney General to prevent non-licensed or non-prescribing 
health care providers from caring for infections and providing counseling at an SIF given the 
Gonzales decision striking down Attorney General Ashcroft’s authority to prohibit DEA-licensed 
physicians from prescribing lethal doses of controlled substances.  The fact that there is no 
prescribing of controlled substances involved in the primary work of an SIF would further 
attenuate this approach to control, as would the fact that most staff would probably not have DEA 
licenses in the first place. 
 163. See, e.g., United States v. Hurt, 137 Fed. App’x 192 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying the 
statute to an apartment building); United States v. Becker, 230 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000) (to a 
home); United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000) (a restaurant); United States v. 
Bilis, 170 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (a bar); United States v. Cooper, 966 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(a private club); United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1991) (a car dealership); Chen, 
913 F.2d 183 (a motel). 
 164. The statute has also been applied against a wide spectrum of drug-involved activity, but 
rarely if ever where the only drug-related activity was personal use.  The list of activities includes 
manufacturing, see, e.g., Becker, 230 F.3d 1224 (defendant manufactured methamphetamine in 
his home); packaging drugs for distribution, see, e.g.,United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d 340 
(5th Cir. 1997) (defendant handled money for drug-trafficking enterprise, smuggled drugs, and 
provided her property for packaging); storing of drugs, see, e.g., United States v. Moore, 184 F.3d 
790 (8th Cir. 1999) (defendant unloaded drug shipments, used his home for storage facility in 
drug conspiracy); United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir. 1992) (defendant used his 
home for temporary storage of drugs, distribution to drug sellers); distributing or trafficking 
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seen merely as a place “maintain[ed] . . . for the purpose of . . . using any 
controlled substance,”165 would, however, necessarily invite the court to ignore 
the difference between drug dealers using a place in the course of an illicit 
commercial activity aimed at generating profits and licensed health care 
providers working under state auspices to reduce the individual and social 
costs of drug consumption and encourage treatment and rehabilitation of drug 
users.166  This is the plainest of plain language arguments: read it fast, don’t 
think too hard and don’t read it again.  At the first sign of judicial reflection, 
the Attorney General’s lawyers can fall back on an equally simplistic argument 
about the policy underlying the CSA: drugs bad; prosecution good.167  If, 
despite the asserted clarity of the statutory text, congressional intent somehow 
came into the analysis,168 the result would not change: Congress, the 
 
controlled substances, see, e.g., Cooper, 966 F.2d 936 (defendant distributed crack out of his 
private club); actively making drug sales, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 923 F.2d 1397 
(10th Cir. 1990); facilitating drug sales, see, e.g., Chen, 913 F.2d 183 (defendant motel owner 
alerted drug sellers of police presence, stored drugs on premises, loaned money for the purchase 
of drugs for resale); and widespread and routine using in combination with drug distribution, see, 
e.g., United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (over a number of months, large 
groups of individuals consistently gathered in the house to use crack cocaine, undercover officers 
were able to purchase crack cocaine, and witnesses testified to the ready availability of drugs on 
the premises for sale).  Courts have indicated that the application of § 856(a)(1) would be 
inappropriate in the instance of “the ‘casual’ drug user . . . because he does not maintain his house 
for the purpose of using drugs but rather for the purpose of residence, the consumption of drugs 
therein being merely incidental to that purpose.”  Lancaster, 968 F.2d at 1253. 
 165. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2006). 
 166. Critics of the statute’s broad sweep have, to some degree, been reassured by 
prosecutorial practice.  Testifying before Congress, Graham Boyd, Director of the ACLU Drug 
Policy Litigation Project, said that the statute’s “saving grace . . . has been a uniform practice of 
targeting only those business owners who commit substantive drug offenses or conspire with 
those that are committing drug offenses—in other words, criminals who distribute drugs.”  
Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 5519 Before the H. 
Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 49 (2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/drugpolicy/raves/10725leg2 
0021010.html. 
 167. This is not to concede that an SIF would fail within a simplistic war-on-drugs analysis.  
Despite the conventional view that harm reduction programs are in derogation of a zero-tolerance, 
abstinence-only framework of drug control, it is plausible to see harm reduction, for better or 
worse, as a continuation of the war on drugs by other means.  Although harm reduction programs 
do not demand abstinence or set it as a goal, an SEP or SIF might as well be a billboard for the 
dangers of illegal drug use.  The focus of the program, enacted daily in countless encounters with 
clients, is on the bad things that can happen to people when they use drugs.  Thus, do harm 
reduction programs spread the message of drugs’ dangers in a means calculated to reach people 
undeterred by DARE and public service announcements on late night TV. 
 168. Strictly speaking, textual ambiguity is a precondition for consideration of legislative 
intent in traditional statutory construction.  See, e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 
253 (1992) (“[W]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 
judicial inquiry is complete.”);  INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
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government would argue, always intends to take the hardest possible line on 
illicit drug use, and would therefore make no distinction between a crack den 
and some misguided state simulacrum of one. 
Can it be that simple?  We think not. The plain language of the statute can 
be plausibly read to exclude bona fide health facilities authorized under state 
law.  If a court turns for guidance to legislative intent, it will find no support 
for applying the statute to an evidence-based public health intervention 
conducted by licensed health care providers pursuant to state authorization—
unless it simply imputes to Congress an abstract commitment to arrest and 
prosecution as the sole means of addressing illicit drugs.  This is clearly not the 
case: Congress is clear that “[t]he success of Federal drug abuse programs and 
activities requires a recognition that education, treatment, rehabilitation, 
research, trainings and law enforcement efforts are interrelated” and that 
“[c]ontrol of drug abuse requires . . . both effective law enforcement . . . and 
effective health programs.”169  The CSA is a health promotion and drug 
treatment statute, not just a warrant for arresting drug traffickers.  In 
preemption terms, Congress has not made the requisite clear statement of an 
intention to displace the state’s regulation of what constitutes proper health 
care for and public health interventions among drug users.  The CSA itself 
recognizes and protects local policy making in its savings clause, which 
protects state laws that do not create a positive conflict with a CSA 
provision.170  Unlike California’s medical marijuana scheme, which created an 
unavoidable Supremacy Clause conflict with the CSA, the Crack House Statute 
can only be applied to a state SIF through the sort of regulatory over-reaching 
by the federal government that the Supreme Court rejected in the Oregon 
Death with Dignity case.171  Ultimately, federal suppression of a state SIF 
would pose a serious question about Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause. 
The climb down from the heights of rhetorical abstraction might as well 
begin with the language of the statute.  Section 856 does not apply to any 
activity authorized under Subchapter I of the statute.172  This subchapter 
generally deals with the licit medical and scientific uses of controlled 
substances, which is why the broad language of § 856 does not sweep in 
hospitals and doctors’ offices and the landlords who rent to them.  The 
 
concurring) (“Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislator’s intentions.  Where the 
language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative 
intent.”). 
 169. 21 USC § 1101 (2006). 
 170. Id. § 903. 
 171. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 172. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904. 
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subchapter also includes a general savings provision specifying Congress’s 
intentions with respect to state law in the drug field: 
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on 
the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, 
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same 
subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, 
unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and 
that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.173 
If § 903 affirms the validity of state drug-related legislation that is not 
patently incompatible with federal law, then a valid state authorization of an 
SIF would constitute authorization under the subchapter and therefore remove 
the SIF from the coverage of § 856—unless the authorization creates such a 
positive conflict with § 856 that the two “cannot consistently stand 
together.”174  This might at first blush look circular, but in fact we are 
presented with a perfectly linear, though hardly simple, question of statutory 
interpretation that cannot be answered by pretending the relevant language is 
plain.  By its structure, § 856 excludes bona fide medical and scientific 
interventions involving controlled drugs, which it defines by reference to those 
activities authorized under the subchapter.175  The SIF we hypothesize would 
be a health care facility, serving as an instrument of public health and helping 
to reduce the disorder and other social costs associated with drug dependency.  
It would be authorized as such under state law.  That it might be described as a 
place “knowingly . . . maintain[ed] . . . for the purpose of . . . using any 
controlled substance,” no more resolves the matter than it would in the case of 
a pain clinic or a hospice. 
Thus we may turn to legislative intent to show that a public health 
intervention like an SIF would not have been seen as conflicting with § 856 or 
the CSA as a whole.176  The CSA is not simply a declaration of criminal 
 
 173. Id. § 903 (emphasis added). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Of course, if the staff of a hospital or clinic were to provide controlled substances 
without a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of practice, they would no longer be 
within the definitional safe harbor, and would be subject to prosecution for distribution.  In that 
case, the hospital or clinic or office could be prosecuted as a crack house—if those responsible 
were aware of the illegal activity.  See, e.g., Robin Fitzgerald, Three Given Bond in ‘Pill Mill’ 
Case, Ruling on Doctor Pending, SUN HERALD, Aug. 12, 2008, at A1. 
 176. The application of § 856 to an SIF might well prove to be the occasion for another 
Supreme Court debate about textualism versus “contextualism” in federal statutory construction.  
See, e.g., Almedarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228–39 (1998).  For a discussion of 
the various permutations of statutory interpretive theories over the last century, see also Jonathan 
T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006); John F. Manning, 
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001); Caleb Nelson, What Is 
Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).  One must assume that both the text of the statute and 
legislative intent—divined from some combination of “the statute’s language, structure, subject 
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justice’s war on drugs.177  Consistent with our international treaty 
obligations,178 the CSA creates a regime that deals comprehensively with the 
control and appropriate use of dangerous drugs, which requires balancing the 
control of trafficking and illicit possession with the legitimate use of controlled 
drugs for health purposes.  The chapter of which it is a part also has the 
purpose of supporting and facilitating drug treatment and rehabilitation.179  The  
 
matter, context, and history,” Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228—will be salient in any court’s 
analysis. 
 177. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 288–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing 
the broad sweep of the CSA beyond controlling drug abuse). 
 178. The United States is a signatory to the three main international drug treaties.  See United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 
20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 [hereinafter Convention on Narcotic Drugs]; Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204, amended by Protocol 
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, March 25, 1972, T.I.A.S. 8118 
[hereinafter Single Convention]; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, T.I.A.S. 
No. 9725, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175.  All were enacted before the HIV/AIDS epidemic made the 
transmission of blood-borne disease through drug injection a major international health problem, 
but all include provisions in their preambles and their substantive provisions affirming the 
obligation of signatories to address the needs of people with drug dependence for drug treatment 
and other health and social services.  See, e.g., Single Convention, supra, art. 38 (“Parties shall 
give special attention to and take all practicable measures for the prevention of abuse of drugs and 
for the early identification, treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration 
of the persons involved . . . .”); Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra, art. 14 & 12 (requiring that 
“Parties [to the Convention] shall adopt appropriate measures aimed at eliminating or reducing 
illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with a view to reducing human 
suffering” which includes interventions to counteract the social and health consequences of drug 
abuse); Convention on Psychotropic Substances, supra (“The Parties, being concerned with the 
health and welfare of mankind, [agree to] . . . recogniz[e] that the use of psychotropic substances 
for medical and scientific purposes is indispensable and that their availability for such purposes 
should not be unduly restricted.”).  As Ian Malkin has argued, the interpretation of terms like 
“rehabilitation,” “treatment,” and “social reintregration” is left to the parties, see Malkin, supra 
note 15, at 715–17, and the UNODC’s lawyers have opined that an SIF could fit well within those 
terms, see U.N. Int’l Drug Control Programme [UNDCP], Legal Affairs Section, Flexibility of 
Treaty Provisions as Regards Harm Reduction Approaches, ¶¶ 23–24, U.N. Doc 
E/INCB/2002/W.13/SS.5 (Sept. 30, 2002) [hereinafter UNDCP, Flexibility of Treaty Provisions]. 
 179. In the late 1980s, scholars in the United States began to comprehensively study how 
efforts to stem diversion undermine the availability of controlled substances for legitimate 
purposes such as the treatment of pain.  See, e.g., David E. Joranson & June L. Dahl, Achieving 
Balance in Drug Policy: The Wisconsin Model, in 11 ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND 
THERAPY 197 (C. Stratton Hill, Jr. & William S. Fields eds., 1989).  This scholarship 
reinvigorated the idea—seldom appreciated and increasingly marginalized in developing policy 
circles at the time—that treaty obligations of the United States, see sources supra note 178, 
require that efforts to reduce diversion of controlled substances be balanced against the need to 
provide access to controlled substances for medical care.  The salience of this “principle of 
balance” is evident by the fact that the CSA explicitly implements the treaties from which the 
principle derives and by the multifaceted nature of the CSA itself as a framework that furthers a 
wide range of health-related objectives.  The bill that created the CSA listed diversion efforts as 
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same is true specifically of the legislation that added § 856 to the CSA.180   
 
one of three important objectives in “dealing with the growing menace of drug abuse” by stating 
its aims as: 
(1) . . . providing authority for increased efforts in drug abuse prevention and 
rehabilitation of users, (2) . . . providing more effective means for law enforcement 
aspects of drug abuse prevention and control, and (3) by providing for an overall balanced 
scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs. 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, H.R. 18583, 91st Cong. (1970), 
H.R. Rep. No. 1444 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4567. 
  The CSA itself includes introductory language noting that “many of the drugs . . . 
[regulated under it] have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain 
the health and general welfare of the American people.”  21 U.S.C. § 801(1) (2006).  As a result, 
“[i]n implementing the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the Congress intends” to ensure 
that: 
(A) the availability of psychotropic substances to manufacturers, distributors, dispensers, 
and researchers for useful and legitimate medical and scientific purposes will not be 
unduly restricted; (B) nothing in the Convention will interfere with bona fide research 
activities; and (C) nothing in the Convention will interfere with ethical medical practice in 
this country as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services on the basis of 
a consensus of the views of the American medical and scientific community. 
21 U.S.C. § 801a(3), cited with approval in Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 266–67. 
Along the way, various other health-based amendments have been added to the CSA.  See, e.g., 
Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, tit XXXV, 114 Stat. 1222 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 823(g) (2006)). 
 180. As one court noted while interpreting § 856(a): 
Section 856 was part of comprehensive drug legislation passed in October 1986, designed 
“to strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign cooperation in eradicating illicit drug 
crops and in halting international drug traffic, to improve enforcement of Federal drug 
laws and enhance interdiction of illicit drug shipments, to provide strong Federal 
leadership in establishing effective drug abuse prevention and education programs, to 
expand Federal support for drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and for other 
purposes.” 
United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting H.R. 5484, 99th Cong. (1986), 
132 Cong. Rec. S13779 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986)).  Indeed, numerous provisions of the 1986 
legislation creating the Crack House Statute were focused on improving treatment of drug 
addiction and ameliorating the public health harms associated with drug abuse, beyond simply 
proscribing and prosecuting use.  Sections in the 1986 bill provided massive funding for drug 
treatment programs and drug treatment centers, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
570, § 4002, 100 Stat. 3207-102 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006)) (Special 
Alcohol Abuse and Drug Abuse Programs); provided funding for vocational training, job 
counseling, and education equivalency programs to alcohol abusers and drug abusers in need of 
such services, id.; modified the mandate and structure of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental 
Health Administration, id. § 4003, 100 Stat. 3207-106 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 290aa 
(2000)); provided funding for the training of professional students in the identification and 
treatment of alcohol and drug abuse, id.; provided funding for educating the public with respect to 
the health hazards of alcoholism, alcohol abuse, and drug abuse, and ensuring the widespread 
dissemination of current publications of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
and the National Institute on Drug Abuse, id.; established an Office for Substance Abuse 
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Thus, it is not enough to contend that an SIF tolerates or facilitates illegal drug 
use, though this is certainly a true fact.  The question of the SIF’s character as 
a treatment and rehabilitation intervention must also be taken seriously.181  The 
CSA is explicit in recognizing that many controlled substances with the 
potential for abuse have legitimate medical uses.182  Moreover, the CSA 
explicitly states that “nothing in the Convention will interfere with ethical 
medical practice in this country.”183  What exactly constitutes legitimate 
medial practice has been much debated in recent years, including during the 
Court’s disposition of Gonzales v. Oregon,184  but certainly encompasses “the 
prevention, cure, or alleviation of disease.”185 Traditional treatment for drug 
abuse and the care and treatment of injection-related infections are certainly 
encompassed within “medical practice”; given the increasingly widespread 
appreciation for harm reduction services, the preventive activities of SIFs 
(providing clean needles and paraphernalia, offering guidance, etc.) may be 
reasonably viewed as medical practice as well. 
Lawyers are already grappling with this issue at the international level and 
in other countries.  In 2002, for example, the lawyers at the United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme (now the UN Office on Drugs and 
 
Prevention, id. § 4005, 100 Stat. 3207-111 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 290aa (2000)); 
established a clearinghouse for alcohol and drug abuse information to assure the widespread 
dissemination of such information to States, id.; and provided grants for public and nonprofit 
private entities for projects to demonstrate effective models for the prevention, treatment, and 
rehabilitation of drug abuse and alcohol abuse among high risk youth, id. 
 181. The CSA facilitates rehabilitation and treatment by providing for the registration and 
regulation of physicians that dispense controlled substances for maintenance or detoxification 
treatment.  21 U.S.C. § 823(g) (2006).  The CSA also implicates the practice of medical care in 
how it impacts the use of controlled substances in areas outside of addiction, including the 
treatment of pain and palliative care.  In light of concerns that the CSA overly burdens access to 
opiates and other controlled substances needed in the treatment of pain, see supra note 179, 
federal agencies have re-affirmed their role in ensuring that anti-diversion efforts do not 
compromise the provision of medical care.  See, e.g., Dispensing Controlled Substances for the 
Treatment of Pain Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,716, 52,719–20 (Sept. 6, 2006) (“DEA takes just as 
seriously its obligation to ensure that there is no interference with the dispensing of controlled 
substances to the American public in accordance with the sound medical judgment of their 
physicians.”). 
 182. Indeed, the first finding upon which the statute is founded notes that the CSA regulates 
many drugs that “have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the 
health and general welfare of the American people.”  21 U.S.C. § 801(1) (2006). 
 183. Id. § 801a(3).  This section goes on, “as determined by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services on the basis of a consensus of the views of the American medical and scientific 
community.”  Id. 
 184. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243.  For a discussion of Gonzales as it relates to the broader 
question at hand in the Article, see infra notes 203–21 and accompanying text. 
 185. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1527 (2d ed. 1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Crime) prepared an opinion for discussion at the 75th session of the 
International Narcotics Control Board.186  It described how an SIF—even an 
SIF that included prescription of the client’s drug—could be harmonized with 
the international drug control treaties: 
It might be claimed that this approach is incompatible with the obligations to 
prevent the abuse of drugs, derived from article 38 of the 1961 Convention and 
article 20 of the 1971 Convention. It should not be forgotten, however, that the 
same provisions create an obligation to treat, rehabilitate and reintegrate drug 
addicts, whose implementation depends largely on the interpretation by the 
Parties of the terms in question.  If, for example, the purpose of treatment is 
not only to cure a pathology, but also to reduce the suffering associated with it 
(like in severe-pain management), then reducing IV drug abusers exposure to 
pathogen agents often associated with their abuse patterns (like those causing 
HIV-AIDS, or hepatitis B) should perhaps be considered as treatment.  In this 
light, even supplying a drug addict with the drug he depends on could be seen 
as a sort of rehabilitation and social reintegration, assuming that once his drug 
requirements are taken care of, he will not need to involve himself in criminal 
activities to finance his dependence.187 
As the Supreme Court of British Columbia found in the case of the 
Vancouver SIF: 
While users do not use Insite to directly treat their addiction, they receive 
services and assistance at Insite which reduce the risk of overdose that is a 
feature of their illness, they avoid the risk of being infected or of infecting 
others by injection, and they gain access to counseling and consultation that 
may lead to abstinence and rehabilitation.  All of this is health care.188 
To argue plausibly from congressional intent would require some notice of the 
ways an SIF could, based on current evidence, promote the statutes’ public 
health goals, as well as at least some consideration of the international data and 
experience to date, which suggest that SIFs do not have a significant adverse 
impact on drug control efforts.189  In short, a court sincerely devoted to 
 
 186. See UNDCP, Flexibility of Treaty Provisions, supra note 178. 
 187. Id.  ¶ 23. 
 188. PHS Cmty. Servs. Soc’y v. Att’y General of Can., [2008] B.C.S.C. 661, ¶ 136 (Can.). 
 189. The intent problem here brings to mind the analogous issue of whether or not drug 
paraphernalia laws prohibit state-authorized syringe exchange programs.  Drug paraphernalia 
laws generally prohibit the distribution of any item of any kind with knowledge that it will be 
used for illegal drug consumption.  SEPs entail distributing syringes, cookers, cotton, water, and 
often bleach with the purpose of preventing HIV transmission but with knowledge that the items 
will be used for illegal drug consumption.  In order to eliminate any possible uncertainty about 
the applicability of drug paraphernalia laws, a number of states simply amended their 
paraphernalia laws or otherwise positively authorized syringe exchange programs.  In a few 
places, however, local governments took the position that SEPs did not violate the paraphernalia 
laws in the first place.  The argument was one of intent: paraphernalia laws, though quite broad in 
their terms, were passed to deal with head shops—commercial operations benefiting financially 
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determining whether §  856 was meant to reach a state public health measure 
would have to grapple candidly with the same considerations of epidemiology, 
evaluation data, behavioral research, health care costs, and public order that 
convinced the state to authorize the SEP in the first place.  And to determine 
that the SIF was illegal on this view, it would have to decide that Congress 
intended to significantly constrain states in the exercise of their traditional 
police powers.190 
If we do not start with the conclusion—i.e., with the premise that a public 
health SIF is merely a state-sponsored crack den—we have to take seriously 
the question of why a state-authorized medical facility for preventing public 
health harms of drug use would be treated differently than other facilities 
authorized under the CSA.  Clearly some construction is required here.  Many 
cases apply § 856 to settings that depart from the stereotype of the crack house, 
but every single one is a site where illegal drug business has been transacted 
for gain, so past cases give us no guidance as to how we distinguish places that 
legally operate to support use of controlled substances and those that do so 
illegally.  In contrast to other health care facilities, the drugs consumed at an 
SIF are illicit, but that apparently stark difference begins to fade when placed 
against the background of the many other ways in which an SIF is 
indistinguishable in mission, culture, and mode of operation from any other 
health clinic. 
Consider the text and the case law on the state of mind necessary to 
establish a violation.  Conviction under the statute requires that the operation 
of the facility be “for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using” a 
 
from selling items for illegal drug use—and were never meant to interfere with bona fide public 
health measures.  There has been almost no litigation on this question, but the one published 
opinion to reach the issue, a decision of the Washington Supreme Court, accepted this view.  The 
case arose when a county health department proposed an SEP and the state attorney general 
opined that they were illegal under the paraphernalia law.  The Court concluded: 
It is undisputed the needles at issue in this case are “drug paraphernalia.”  Those 
distributing the needles know they will be used to inject controlled substances unlawfully.  
Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue, the needle exchange program is authorized under the 
Washington Constitution, statutes granting broad powers to local health officials, and the 
omnibus AIDS act.  Therefore, they conclude, the drug paraphernalia act, which is aimed 
at criminal conduct, simply does not apply to their actions.  We agree, finding the 
[Spokane County Health Department]’s needle exchange program permissible under the 
constitution and statutes of this state. 
Spokane County Health District v. Brockett, 839 P.2d 324, 328 (Wash. 1992). 
 190. Congress does from time to time do just that, see, e.g., United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding the congressional prohibition of “filled milk” 
despite the fact that the regulation of food was at the time predominantly within the traditional 
sphere of state regulation), but the presumption is that it does not without clearly stating the 
intention to do so.  See discussion supra Part II.D.2.  See generally PARMET, supra note 5 
(analyzing the treatment of health measures by courts). 
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controlled substance.191  Case law has noted that “purpose” and “knowledge” 
are separate elements.192  A reasonable interpretation of “purpose” provides a 
fair and legitimate means of distinguishing between criminal enterprises using 
property as part of an illicit commercial drug venture and public or health care 
enterprises deploying controlled substances for therapeutic purposes or, as in 
the case of an SIF, allowing the use of drugs for therapeutic reasons.  Just as a 
hospital is operated to treat patients, not to facilitate the use of controlled 
substances, and a methadone clinic is operated to treat drug dependency, not to 
facilitate the use of controlled substances, an SIF is operated to reduce the 
individual and social costs of drug injection, not to facilitate the use of 
controlled substances. 
The interpretation of “purpose” in this way is quite familiar to students of 
the CSA: it is the same means used to solve the identical problem of 
distinguishing between legal and illegal provision of controlled substances by 
doctors.193  The CSA regulates the medical use of controlled substances 
primarily “to prevent diversion of medically useful dangerous drugs into 
illegitimate channels.”194 The line between the dedicated physician treating a 
patient and the doctor turned drug pusher is therefore whether the drug has 
been provided for “a legitimate medical purpose” in the “usual course of 
professional practice,” or has simply been sold without any medical 
justification in order to make money.195  A doctor who is treating a real illness 
in a manner accepted as appropriate by her peers, who is maintaining proper 
records, monitoring the patient’s progress, making necessary referrals and 
otherwise behaving in a customary and transparent manner satisfies this 
standard.196  A doctor who is selling prescriptions with no or cursory 
 
 191. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 192. United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 193. See 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006); United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 138–43 
(1975). 
 194. 116 CONG. REC. 996 (1970) (statement of Sen. Dodd); see also Moore, 432 U.S. at 135; 
S. REP. NO. 91-613, at 4 (1969) (“The control drug abuse and of both the legitimate and 
illegitimate traffic in drugs is the main objective of the bill S. 3246.”).  Congress was aware that 
physicians, who have the greatest access to controlled substances, were in some instances also the 
source of drugs diverted into illegal markets.  See Moore, 432 U.S. at 135; 116 CONG. REC. 998, 
1663 (respective statements of Sens. Griffin and Hruska).  The only substantive rule of medical 
practice in the CSA is that physicians may not ordinarily prescribe controlled substances merely 
to satisfy an addiction.  21 U.S.C. § 829(c) (2006) (“No controlled substance in schedule V which 
is a drug may be distributed or dispensed other than for a medical purpose.”).  Neither this issue 
nor the diversion concern is implicated by SIFs. 
 195. Moore, 423 U.S. at 135–38, 136 n.2 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 306.04(a) (1973) (redesignated 
as 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (1975))). 
 196. Id. at 140–42. 
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examination, keeping no or useless records, and not seriously treating the 
patient, has crossed the line.197 
By this test, the SIF surely looks legal.  To start with, there is no question 
of prescribing controlled substances.  The operation would be run on standard 
clinical lines: clients (patients) register; records are kept documenting progress; 
care is provided based on examination and clear medical need; and patients are 
referred to specialists for their addiction, HIV, or other needs.  The basic 
medical care offered at the clinic, first aid and care for minor wounds and 
infection, is obviously proper and well-accepted.  Perhaps the most “edgy” 
form of clinical intervention—advising people how to avoid infections or other 
injuries when injecting illegal drugs—is already done (albeit in the abstract) by 
SEPs and other forms of IDU outreach and education, and fares well when put 
to the Moore test: there is a legitimate medical purpose—preventing infection 
or injury—untainted by any commercial purpose or personal gain; the advice 
comes as part of a comprehensive clinical intervention, is based on individual 
need, and is documented.198  It is not different, apart from the substance to be 
injected, than giving the same care to an insulin patient.  Even if we accept that 
the SIF as a comprehensive intervention is novel, and therefore not common 
medical practice as a whole, the public health evidence and the state’s 
authorization amply support the conclusion that its purpose is legitimate.199 
 
 197. See, e.g., id. at 142–43.  In Moore the Court found the evidence sufficient to establish 
that defendant’s conduct “exceeded the bounds of ‘professional practice’” when he failed to give 
adequate physical examinations or gave none at all, ignored the results of the tests he did make, 
widely distributed methadone prescriptions at the clinic without taking precautions against its 
misuse and diversion or regulating the dosage at all, prescribing as much and as frequently as the 
patient demanded, and charging patients based on the number of tablets desired rather than 
medical services.  Id. (“In practical effect, he acted as a large-scale ‘pusher’—not as a 
physician.”); see also United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 474 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding 
enough evidence to sustain probable cause of illicit practice when given that defendant “had a 
reputation in the drug community for his practice of prescribing high amounts of narcotics,” 
demanding $1000 cash “initiation fees” and $250 cash monthly “maintenance fees,” allegations 
that defendant “made a common practice of fronting drugs rather than practicing medicine”); 
United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a jury could find 
defendant’s practice of selling controlled prescription drugs over the internet without examining 
patients outside the course of usual professional practice); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 
1317 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that defendant was found on numerous occasions to have 
“dispensed controlled substances pursuant to prescriptions he knew to be forged”). 
 198. See discussion supra note 197. 
 199. In making this argument, we do not argue that a court would actually be interpreting the 
provisions of the CSA governing prescriptions, because no prescribing, dispensing or 
administering of controlled substances is involved in the operating of an SIF.  We are simply 
drawing upon, and suggesting that a court would draw upon, the case law standards on 
“legitimate medical purpose” to interpret § 856.  We assume here that there has been no specific 
regulation or interpretive guidance promulgated by the Attorney General defining the operation of 
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Like a hospital or a methadone clinic (and unlike a crack house) an SIF is 
operated with the staff of licensed health care providers for a therapeutic and 
preventive health purpose.  To be sure, “purpose” is a word that is normally 
not construed to mean “sole” purpose.  In at least one case, government 
lawyers have conceded that it requires “specific purpose,” but in another, a 
court has ruled that “sole purpose” is not required.200  Still, previous cases 
dealing with this issue under § 856 have all dealt with it in regards to places 
being used in drug dealings, and the “other” purposes offered to defeat 
conviction were things like the ownership or control over the dwelling or 
participation in the drug trafficking.201  An SIF is providing a space for use of 
controlled substances not for its own sake or for profit, but in order to promote 
drug treatment, prevent disease, and avoid overdose mortality.  Allowing drug 
use is not the purpose, but the means to achieve other purposes—just as the 
“purpose” of using morphine in a hospital is not the use of morphine, but the 
relief of pain.  Reading the statute to require an illegal purpose, and defining 
that in terms of directly or indirectly seeking to profit from illegal drug 
activity, provides a fairly bright line that distinguishes crack dens and shooting 
galleries from pharmaceutical factories, hospitals—and SIFs.  By contrast, if 
the mere knowledge that drugs will be used on the premises is enough to 
establish that such use is the “purpose” of the defendant, then the “purpose” 
element adds nothing to the scienter requirement that is not already captured in 
the element of “knowingly.”202 
 
an SIF as being outside legitimate medical practice.  We consider that possibility in our 
discussion of preemption, infra Part III.D.2. 
 200. United States v. Chen, 913 F2d. 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that the “for the 
purpose of” language contained in 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) applies to the person who opens or 
maintains the place for the illegal activity and therefore, the person who manages or controls the 
building and then rents to others need not have the express purpose in doing so that drug related 
activity take place; rather, such activity is engaged in by others (others have the purpose)); but see 
United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 220 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant, who was 
convicted of aiding and abetting the maintenance of a place for the purpose of manufacturing 
“crack” cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), was not entitled to have “primary” added to 
a jury instruction regarding “purpose” because the phrase in § 856(a)(1) making it “an offense to 
maintain a place for ‘the purpose’ of manufacturing or distributing cocaine . . . [was] within the 
common understanding of jurors and [required] no further elaboration”). 
 201. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1993).  The court in Banks held 
that it had been sufficiently shown that the defendant maintained a house as proscribed under 
§ 856(a) where the defendant owned the house, fed the actual seller of crack, identified callers for 
the seller, and notified the seller of potential sales.  Id. at 466.  The court so found despite the fact 
that two other individuals were the supervisors of the crack house and the entrepreneurs who 
supplied the crack.  Id. at 466–67.  According to the court, the defendant’s role was “a step 
beyond a mere underling and a step beyond a mere landlord and therefore could be viewed as 
maintaining a managerial or supervisory role.” Id. at 467. 
 202. On this point, analogies with nuisance law are apt.  In general, law prohibits activity that 
either unreasonably endangers the safety of others or involves a property being used for unlawful 
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The argument presented here provides a solid basis for deciding that a 
state-authorized SIF would not conflict with the purposes or language of § 856, 
and therefore that the savings provision of § 903 would be sufficient to 
constitute the authorization “under this subchapter” that excludes an activity 
from the coverage of § 856. 
2. Preemption?  The CSA Savings Clause and the Clear Statement Rule 
The uncertainty around the application of § 856 implicates another way of 
looking at the question, one which the Attorney General might rely on if the 
going got tough.  Rather than asking whether the doctors and nurses operating 
the SIF, or the state agency sponsoring it, are “criminals”—which after all no 
one really believes—the question can be posed in the more sterile terms of 
preemption: the state has, it would be argued, passed a law—authorizing an 
SIF—that purports to regulate an issue over which Congress has asserted sole 
jurisdiction.  CSA regulates the area of controlled substances; while neither 
§ 856 nor the CSA explicitly or implicitly “occupy the field,” § 856 does 
prohibit the operation of places that use drugs, and the CSA overall is aimed at 
stopping illegal drug use.  Thus, a law that allows what § 856 prohibits is in 
direct conflict and undermines the CSA’s basic purpose, and state law 
authorizing an SIF is preempted by § 856. 
The preemption perspective highlights how close this case is to Gonzales 
v. Oregon, but that hardly simplifies a prediction of the Court’s analysis.203  
The matter turns initially on whether the issue is simply the meaning of § 856 
(or the meaning of “legitimate medical purpose”), or whether the Attorney 
General has issued some form of interpretive guidance or regulation 
formalizing her interpretation under one or both of these provisions.  In the 
former situation we go straight to the preemption analysis; in the latter 
situation, as in Gonzales, there are the prior questions of whether the Attorney 
General has the authority to issue such an interpretation at all and, if so, what 
weight should be assigned it. 
An unadorned preemption analysis is favorable to the state given the 
plausible interpretation of § 856 we have offered.  Any form of preemption 
 
conduct.  See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 2008).  Absent state authorization, an 
SIF would almost certainly run afoul of this type of provision.  However, if the state authorized 
an SIF, the employees and the IDUs would not be engaging in “unlawful conduct,” and the 
premises would not be maintained for the purpose of engaging in unlawful conduct.  Similarly, 
state authorization should give SIF operators a reasonable claim of “lawfulness” against a federal 
statute like § 856(a) that is predicated on knowingly maintaining a place for the purpose of 
unlawful—if unlawfulness is concededly read into the statute—drug activity. 
 203. There is no real preemption issue if the federal law clearly prohibits what the state 
purports to authorize; that is simply a matter of the Supremacy Clause (assuming the prohibition 
is within the federal government’s power), but as we have argued this case is not that easy. 
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analysis204 begins with a presumption against finding that Congress intended to 
override state law in areas of traditional state regulation.205  In service of this 
presumption, the Court requires the intent to preempt be, if not explicit, 
unmistakable: federalism dictates that “the historic police powers of the States 
[are] not to be superseded by [a federal law] unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”206  In the case of the CSA, Congress made 
explicit its intent to limit the preemptive effect of the statute in § 903.207 
The Gonzales Court was emphatic about the limited scope of the CSA in 
relation to medical practice: 
The statute and our case law amply support the conclusion that Congress 
regulates medical practice insofar as it bars doctors from using their 
prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and 
trafficking as conventionally understood.  Beyond this, however, the statute 
manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally.  The silence 
is understandable given the structure and limitations of federalism, which 
allow the States “great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the 
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”208 
The SIF has nothing to do with the prescribing of controlled substances.  It 
is quite possible that no one involved in operating it would even have a DEA 
license.  We have shown that the applicability of § 856 to the SIF is not clear, 
let alone manifest.  If there are serious plain-language and legislative-intent 
arguments as to the inapplicability of the statute, and no doubt as to the modest 
intentions of Congress with respect to state health and medical regulation, the 
 
 204. Although the concept can be difficult, see, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of 
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994) (noting Congress’s power to preempt state law is 
unquestionable, yet “[t]he apparent precision, orderliness, and axiomatic quality of this black-
letter position, however, conceals fundamental confusion in the thinking of judges and scholars 
alike about the underlying nature of preemption”), in general, preemption may be classified as 
express, conflict, or field.  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) 
(“Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command 
is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.  
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of implied pre-
emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, and conflict 
pre-emption, where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility 
. . . .” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  See also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990) (“[F]ield pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-
emption: A state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress’ intent (either 
express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation.”). 
 205. See English, 496 U.S. at 79; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
 206. See, e.g., Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991); Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (emphasis added). 
 207. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2006).  
 208. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269–70 (2006) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 475 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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general presumption against preemption and the CSA’s “positive conflict” rule 
both militate against finding preemption.209 
But matters are not likely to be that simple.  As a preemption case, the SIF 
matter would begin to look like a re-try of Gonzales.  If the Attorney General 
elects to take on the state, she might start by laying out her views in a formal 
document along the lines of the “Interpretive Rule” John Ashcroft issued 
concerning physician-assisted death.210  In this document, he purported to find 
that prescribing controlled substances for purposes of assisting a suicide under 
Oregon law was not a legitimate medical practice, and announced that he 
therefore would act to revoke the federal controlled substances licenses of 
doctors who did so.211  The promulgation of such guidance would require an 
analytic detour through questions of the Attorney General’s authority under the 
CSA, and the degree of deference due her interpretations in this context.  In 
this detour, we will follow the map provided by Gonzales. 
The Court in Gonzales took the position that the CSA does not give the 
Attorney General authority to issue rules governing the practice of medicine 
generally.212  Aside from authority over scheduling, the relevant portion of the 
CSA has two provisions authorizing the Attorney General to promulgate rules.  
21 U.S.C. § 821 provides that she may “promulgate rules . . . relating to the 
registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of 
controlled substances.”  21  U.S.C. § 871(b) authorizes the Attorney General to 
“promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures which he may 
deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient execution of his functions 
under this subchapter.”  The Supreme Court interpreted these apparently 
capacious authorizations quite strictly in Gonzales, finding it “evident” that 
“Congress did not delegate to the Attorney General authority to carry out or 
effect all provisions of the CSA.  Rather, he can promulgate rules relating only 
to ‘registration’ and ‘control,’ and ‘for the efficient execution of his functions’ 
 
 209. The case could be further complicated by reconsidering the essential nature of § 856.  As 
we have suggested above, the Crack House Statute looks much more like a nuisance provision 
than a drug control law.  See discussion supra notes 92, 93 & 202.  In this respect, then, we can 
frame the case as a conflict between state and federal law on the matter of what constitutes a 
nuisance.  The SIF authorization constitutes the state’s determination that a health care facility 
providing treatment and preventive services to IDUs is not a nuisance, and § 856 purports to say 
it is.  The exercise of state police power through the device of nuisance might be said to be one of 
the most venerable regulatory practices in our constitutional history.  See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, 
THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 29 (1904).  This perspective 
adds weight to the proposition that an unambiguously clear and manifest statement of preemptive 
intent is required—and certainly not to be found in § 856 or anywhere else in the CSA. 
 210. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed.Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 
2001). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258. 
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under the statute.”213  These provisions do not empower the Attorney General 
“to make a rule declaring illegitimate a medical standard for care and treatment 
of patients that is specifically authorized under state law.”214 In his dissent, 
Justice Scalia argued passionately that the majority was willfully misreading 
the statute, and many commentators have agreed with him.215  The immediate 
consequence of accepting Scalia’s interpretation would have been the 
triggering of a deferential rule of review,216 which would at least have made it 
more difficult for the Court to reach its conclusion.  For our purposes, the force 
of Scalia’s argument goes to the question of whether different facts might 
produce a different result. 
Would things be different in an SIF case?  Putting aside changes in the 
composition of the Court, stare decisis suggests that if the Attorney General 
lacks the authority to define a legitimate medical purpose with respect to 
doctors treating terminally ill patients, she would have no greater authority 
over health care providers treating drug users.  But the analogy is complicated 
by a few differences in both facts and law.  We are, first of all, dealing with the 
interpretation of § 856, which does not on its face concern health care, and so 
the Court might construe the Attorney General’s “control” power more 
expansively.  This argument, though consistent with deference to government 
in the war on drugs, would not find support in Gonzales or the facts.  In 
Gonzales, over Scalia’s heated objections,217 the Court drew upon 21 U.S.C. 
 
 213. Id. at 259.  According to the Court, there was no grant in either provision of a power to 
declare illegal a practice authorized by state law and not clearly prohibited in the CSA.  The 
limits on the Attorney General’s authority under § 821 are discussed further below.  As to § 871, 
the Court wrote: 
This section allows the Attorney General to best determine how to execute “his 
functions.”  It is quite a different matter, however, to say that the Attorney General can 
define the substantive standards of medical practice as part of his authority.  To find a 
delegation of this extent in § 871 would put that part of the statute in considerable tension 
with the narrowly defined delegation concerning control and registration.  It would go, 
moreover, against the plain language of the text to treat a delegation for the “execution” of 
his functions as a further delegation to define other functions well beyond the statute’s 
specific grants of authority. 
Id. at 264–65. 
 214. Id at 258. 
 215. Id. at 275–86 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 216. If the case presented an interpretation of the CSA by the Attorney General, Chevron 
deference would apply.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–45 (1984).  Were the Attorney General interpreting a CSA regulation, deference would be 
required under the Auer line of cases.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (holding that an 
administrative rule interpreting the issuing agency’s own ambiguous regulation may receive 
substantial deference). 
 217. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court concludes that the 
Attorney General lacked authority to declare assisted suicide illicit under the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA), because the CSA is concerned only with ‘illicit drug dealing and 
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§ 802 for a quite narrow, technical definition of “control”: “The term ‘control’ 
means to add a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, to a schedule 
under part B of this subchapter, whether by transfer from another schedule or 
otherwise.”218  On this view, control has nothing to do with the situation in an 
SIF, but even if it were interpreted more broadly (as Justice Scalia suggests) 
the authority to promulgate regulations related to the “control of the 
manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances” would not 
clearly encompass an SIF regulation, since no manufacture, distribution or 
dispensing occurs there, and the authority does not extend to control of 
“use.”219  No doubt there is scope for using “relating to” to get the camel’s 
nose into the tent, but at that point the stretching has reached yogic levels. 
The same problem arises if we conceptualize the matter as an interpretation 
of “legitimate medical purpose.”  Certainly the Attorney General could (and on 
our interpretation of § 856 would have to) contend that operating an SIF to 
reduce morbidity and mortality associated with injection drug use is not a 
lawful purpose.  Just as in Gonzales, it could be argued that the Attorney 
General would thus be claiming the “extraordinary authority” to “declare an 
entire class of activity outside ‘the course of professional practice,’ and 
therefore a criminal violation of the CSA.”220  Moreover, though it is logical to 
read a “legitimate medical purpose” criterion into § 856 in a case involving an 
SIF, the case would not actually involve the regulatory areas covered by the 
prescription provisions in which the standard is found: there is literally no 
prescribing, dispensing, or administering (let alone manufacturing or delivery) 
of controlled substances at an SIF.  The Attorney General would be seeking to 
assert control over areas of medical practice and public health—wound care, 
disease prevention—over which he has no direct regulatory warrant on the 
 
trafficking.’  This question-begging conclusion is obscured by a flurry of arguments that distort 
the statute and disregard settled principles of our interpretive jurisprudence.” (citations omitted)). 
 218. Id. at 260 (majority opinion) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(5) (2000 & Supp. V 2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 219. The Court itself considers the implications of a broader definition of “control” in 
Gonzales: 
Even if “control” in § 821 were understood to signify something other than its statutory 
definition, it would not support the Interpretive Rule.  The statutory references to 
“control” outside the scheduling context make clear that the Attorney General can 
establish controls “against diversion,” e.g., § 823(a)(1), but do not give him authority to 
define diversion based on his view of legitimate medical practice.  As explained below, 
the CSA’s express limitations on the Attorney General’s authority, and other indications 
from the statutory scheme, belie any notion that the Attorney General has been granted 
this implicit authority.  Indeed, if “control” were given the expansive meaning required to 
sustain the Interpretive Rule, it would transform the carefully described limits on the 
Attorney General’s authority over registration and scheduling into mere suggestions. 
Id. at 260–61. 
 220. Id. at 262. 
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ground that it does not constitute legitimate medical practice.  It is thus 
difficult to see how § 821, which the Court said did not give the Attorney 
General the authority to prohibit DEA-licensed physicians from prescribing 
lethal doses of controlled substances, would empower her to issue rules barring 
non-licensed or non-prescribing health care providers from caring for 
infections and providing counseling at an SIF.221 
There are of course instances where Congress does step in to regulate 
medical practice, but they are as distinguishable in this instance as they are in 
Gonzales.  Most notably, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Attorney General asserted 
that the cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical purposes, even if 
legal under California law, was explicitly barred by virtue of marijuana’s 
inclusion in Schedule I of the CSA.222  Drugs in Schedule I have been 
determined to have no legitimate medical use.223  The Raich case therefore 
exhibited a clear conflict between two explicit and mutually exclusive laws at 
the state and federal level, a conflict easily resolved under the Supremacy 
Clause once the authority underlying the federal law was upheld.224 
 
 221. The CSA does give the Attorney General authority to register (or deny registration to) 
practitioners to “conduct research with . . . controlled substances.”  21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2006).  
This provision, however, only reaches research that entails the actual use of controlled substances 
as an intrinsic element of the study.  Id.  Observational research on drug use and drug users, of the 
sort that would surely be part of a pilot SIF evaluation, has never been thought to require 
registration, and is quite common.  See, e.g., Kerr et al., supra note 71; Wood et al., supra note 
49. 
 222. The Court wrote in Raich: 
The CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable 
medical uses.  Moreover, the CSA is a comprehensive regulatory regime specifically 
designed to regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for medicinal purposes, 
and in what manner.  Indeed, most of the substances classified in the CSA “have a useful 
and legitimate medical purpose.”  21 U.S.C. § 801(1).  Thus, even if respondents are 
correct that marijuana does have accepted medical uses and thus should be redesignated 
as a lesser schedule drug, the CSA would still impose controls beyond what is required by 
California law.  The CSA requires manufacturers, physicians, pharmacies, and other 
handlers of controlled substances to comply with statutory and regulatory provisions 
mandating registration with the DEA, compliance with specific production quotas, 
security controls to guard against diversion, recordkeeping and reporting obligations, and 
prescription requirements. See §§ 821–830; 21 CFR § 1301 et seq. (2004).  Furthermore, 
the dispensing of new drugs, even when doctors approve their use, must await federal 
approval.  United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 99 S.Ct. 2470, 61 L.Ed.2d 68 
(1979).  Accordingly, the mere fact that marijuana—like virtually every other controlled 
substance regulated by the CSA—is used for medicinal purposes cannot possibly serve to 
distinguish it from the core activities regulated by the CSA. 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
 223. See id. at 27. 
 224. The Court acknowledged that “evidence proffered by respondents in this case regarding 
the effective medical uses for marijuana, if found credible after trial, would cast serious doubt on 
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By now it should be clear that the illegality of an SIF under § 856 is open 
to serious doubt.  We think legality is actually the stronger position, both from 
textual and legislative intent perspectives, but uncertainty alone is sufficient to 
trigger a cascade of other legal and policy considerations in favor of an SIF.  
There is, of course, the rule of lenity, the traditional practice of interpreting 
ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the defendant.225  More significantly, 
the consequence of interpreting the statute to bar a state public health measure 
would be, as we discuss below, to force the fundamental constitutional 
question of Congress’s authority to impose such a prohibition.  Courts 
anticipating such collisions are subject to the prudential tradition of avoiding 
deciding cases on constitutional grounds when an alternate, plausible 
interpretation of a statute is possible: “[W]here a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions 
arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt 
the latter.”226  Collisions tending to occur despite rules of prudence, we turn 
now to the constitutional question. 
 
the accuracy of the findings that require marijuana to be listed in Schedule I,” but pointed out 
that, as in the case of an SIF, the Court’s task is to identify the correct decision-maker, not the 
correct decision: “[T]he possibility that the drug may be reclassified in the future has no relevance 
to the question whether Congress now has the power to regulate its production and distribution.”  
Id. at 27 n.37. 
 225. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (“[A]mbiguity concerning 
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” (citing Bell v. United States, 
349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955))); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1987). 
  Along the same lines, there is a general judicial distaste for vague criminal statutes.  
Ambiguous criminal laws are objectionable on at least two grounds rooted in due process.  There 
is a notice problem in prosecuting someone for an activity he could not reasonably be expected to 
know was proscribed.  See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] 
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first 
essential of due process of law.”).  There is also a problem of unfair and arbitrary application of 
the law by law enforcement agents in particular cases.  See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352, 358 (1983) (“[W]e have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness 
doctrine ‘is . . . the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement . . . .’  Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal 
statute may permit ‘a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to 
pursue their personal predilections.’”(citations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 
574–75 (1974))).  Both sections of the Crack House Statute have survived vagueness challenges, 
but only in cases that involved egregious drug trafficking.  See, e.g., United States v. Lancaster, 
968 F.2d 1250, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that § 856 is not an unconstitutionally vague 
prohibition in a case involving a typical crack house).  In any event, proprietors of an SIF would 
not need to place primary or even explicit reliance on these principles to garner some benefit from 
them in litigation. 
 226. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250 (1998) (Scalia J., dissenting) 
(quoting United States ex. rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 
(1909)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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3. Congressional Overreach?  The Commerce Clause as Deus ex 
Machina 
The constitutional authority for the CSA derives from Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.227  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted this power expansively,228 to the point that challenges to 
the exercise of the Commerce power are virtually never successful.  In two 
recent instances, however, the Court has invalidated federal statutes as being 
insufficiently related to interstate commerce,229 and if ever there was a case 
that presented a reasonable hope of being the third, it would be the case of a 
state-authorized SIF.230 
 
 227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have [the] power . . . [t]o regulate commerce . . . 
among the several states . . . .”). 
 228. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 130 
(14th ed. 2001) (noting how the Great Depression and the Civil Rights movement altered the 
balance of federal and state regulatory power). 
 229. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995), the Court struck down a provision 
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act as an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce Clause authority.  
In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000), the Court held that a federal statute that 
provided a civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence was not regulation of 
activity that substantially affected interstate commerce.  In Morrison, the Court announced a four-
factor test for determining if a purely intrastate activity substantially affects interstate commerce.  
Id. at 609–13.  Distilled from these two decisions, what became known as the “Lopez-Morrison 
test” considered: (1) the commercial nature of the activity; (2) the existence in the statute of a 
jurisdictional element that limits the statute’s reach; (3) the existence of Congressional findings 
on the relationship; and (4) how attenuated the effects on commerce are.  Id. 
 230. There has not been a major federalism case since Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts 
joined the Supreme Court.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor were ardent states’ 
rights proponents.  A legal realist could just as easily find the same tendencies in the circuit level 
rulings of Justices Alito and Roberts; both Alito and Roberts had major and controversial 
federalism dissents (pre-Raich but applying the wounded, but breathing, Lopez holding) arguing 
for more circumscribed regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.  Rancho Viejo, LLC v. 
Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (“The panel’s opinion in effect asks whether the challenged regulation substantially affects 
interstate commerce, rather than whether the activity being regulated does so.  Thus, the panel 
sustains the application of the Act in this case because Rancho Viejo’s commercial development 
constitutes interstate commerce and the regulation impinges on that development, not because the 
incidental taking of arroyo toads can be said to be interstate commerce . . . .  Such an approach 
seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings in United States v. Lopez and United States 
v. Morrison.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“In other words, the majority argues in effect that the private, purely 
intrastate possession of machine guns has a substantial effect on the interstate machine gun 
market.  This theory, if accepted, would go far toward converting Congress’s authority to regulate 
interstate commerce into ‘a plenary police power.’  If there is any sort of interstate market for a 
commodity—and I think that it is safe to assume that there is some sort of interstate market for 
practically everything—then the purely intrastate possession of that item will have an effect on 
that market, and outlawing private possession of the item will presumably have a substantial 
effect.  Consequently, the majority’s theory leads to the conclusion that Congress may ban the 
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If they do nothing else, the Court’s decisions in Lopez and Morrison 
resurrect the idea that there can be activity that is not economic for Commerce 
Clause purposes, and that the distinction between economic and non-economic 
activity marks an actual line Congress may not cross.  The essence of the 
state’s argument would be that an SIF is a purely non-commercial activity 
whose impact on interstate commerce, if any impact, falls below even the very 
low threshold set by the Court in its case law.  This is not a bad argument as far 
as it goes.  It is fair to say that there is no economic activity whatsoever in an 
SIF, at least as economic activity is commonly understood.  No one buys 
anything, no one sells anything, no one profits.  Nothing is manufactured or 
warehoused.  That said, Justice Stevens’s opinion in Raich defines 
“commerce” in dicta to include “consumption,”231 which is undeniable at an 
SIF.  Though not a market or supplying a market, the SIF is connected to a 
market: if clients do not buy illegal drugs, they have nothing to inject at the 
SIF.  The empirical data support the argument that the existence or non-
existence of the SIF has no impact on the volume of these purchases, but that 
argument may or may not prevail. 
Wickard v. Filburn232 is often cited as the case that shows how little 
economic activity is enough to justify congressional regulation.  A comparison 
is favorable to the legality of an SIF.  Filburn was a farmer who planted wheat 
beyond his federal allotment, but, he claimed, it was exclusively for his own 
use, not for sale.233  The Court declined to treat Filburn as an atom.  In a move 
that any public health person would not only approve but regard as 
indispensable to rational regulation aimed at controlling the national wheat 
crop as a whole, the Court treated him as a part of a national population: “That 
appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is 
not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, 
his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is 
far from trivial.”234  To say that the Congress could not regulate Filburn’s 
wheat crop because it is just a tiny fraction of the total crop would be like 
saying that the City of Cambridge could not impose smallpox vaccination 
 
purely intrastate possession of just about anything.  But if Lopez means anything, it is that 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause must have some limits. . . . .  In sum, we are left 
with no congressional findings and no appreciable empirical support for the proposition that the 
purely intrastate possession of machine guns, by facilitating the commission of certain crimes, 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and without such support I do not see how the 
statutory provision at issue here can be sustained—unless, contrary to the lesson that I take from 
Lopez, the ‘substantial effects’ test is to be drained of all practical significance.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 231. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2005). 
 232. 317 U.S. 111,128–29 (1942). 
 233. See id. at 114, 128–29. 
 234. Id. at 127–28; accord Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1964). 
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because Mr. Jacobson was just one of thousands of citizens of Cambridge.235  
Likewise, in Raich, the “market” for medical marijuana was neither small nor 
isolated from the larger illegal market.236 
Yet the principle is one of aggregation, not multiplication.  Nothing in the 
Commerce Clause, nor epidemiological methods for that matter, justifies 
treating a sui generis activity as if it were common.  Both farmer Filburn and 
patient Raich were individuals who were like, if not typical of, thousands of 
others in the same market.  The case was a clear and immediate test of the 
regulatory regime.  The SIF we hypothesize, by contrast, is a unique, or one of 
a few specialized public health interventions highly unlikely, for reasons of 
need, cost and politics, ever to exist in substantial numbers.  There are few if 
any “others similarly situated.”  It would be difficult for the Attorney General 
to prove, or even assert with a straight face, that one or a few SIFs would 
imperil the CSA drug control scheme by altering the market for controlled 
substances.  Indeed, SIFs can reasonably be expected to reduce the demand for 
illegal drugs.  Surely this case would take the Commerce Clause beyond its 
long-standing high-water mark.237 
The difficulties with the case for SIF proponents are, nonetheless, many 
and various.  Morrison and Lopez aside, the odds of winning any claim based 
on an argument that “Congress lacks the power to regulate this activity” are 
slim.  The Court wields its Commerce Clause doctrine with an eye not just on 
the “illiction returns,”238 but also the tectonic dynamics of ideology, the 
 
 235. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37–38 (1905) (“We are not prepared to hold 
that a minority, residing or remaining in any city or town where smallpox is prevalent, and 
enjoying the general protection afforded by an organized local government, may thus defy the 
will of its constituted authorities, acting in good faith for all, under the legislative sanction of the 
state.  If such be the privilege of a minority, then a like privilege would belong to each individual 
of the community, and the spectacle would be presented of the welfare and safety of an entire 
population being subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses to remain a part 
of that population.  We are unwilling to hold it to be an element in the liberty secured by the 
Constitution of the United States that one person, or a minority of persons, residing in any 
community and enjoying the benefits of its local government, should have the power thus to 
dominate the majority when supported in their action by the authority of the state.”). 
 236. Raich, 545 U.S. at 30 (“Indeed, that the California exemptions will have a significant 
impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market for marijuana is not just ‘plausible’ as 
the principal dissent concedes, . . . it is readily apparent.” (citation omitted)). 
 237. One commentator has opined: “[Wickard v. Filburn’s] aggregation principle remains 
nominally good law, but it operates only when the actors or activities at issue are commercial.  
Gun possession or sex-motivated violence will not qualify, at least when they lack any visible 
connection to overtly economic activity.”  Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn: 
Agriculture, Aggregation, and Congressional Power over Commerce, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
STORIES 104 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 26, on file with 
authors). 
 238. See generally John B. Taylor, The Supreme Court and Political Eras: A Perspective on 
Judicial Power in a Democratic Polity, 54 REV. POL. 345, 345–46 (1992) (“The Supreme Court, 
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Court’s authority, and regulatory reality.  In doctrinal terms alone, the state 
faces several hurdles.  Consumption may be enough to make this “commerce,” 
and even were it not, Justice Scalia’s theory that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause justifies regulation of non-commercial activity necessary to vindicate 
Congress’s Commerce Clause goals may find more votes.239  It will be easy 
enough to argue, alas in spite of any evidence or even rigorous thinking, that 
an SIF “encourages” drug abuse or is a “symbol” of government endorsement.  
A Court that accepts such “public relations” arguments would have no 
difficulty finding that it was necessary and proper to prohibit SIFs as an 
adjunct to the clearly constitutional regulation of the illegal drug trade.240 
If our analysis of a possible § 856 and preemption case is speculation, 
consideration of the Commerce Clause issue is speculation on stilts.  The 
purpose of this exercise is not to predict a particular result, but rather to 
demonstrate through close legal analysis that there is more than ample doubt 
about the illegality of a state-authorized SIF—indeed, a quite robust basis for 
concluding that such an intervention is legal.  This allows a reasonable 
government lawyer, executive, or legislator to ethically and prudently move 
forward on a test of this potentially life-saving (and money-saving) 
intervention.  If the Attorney General seeks to enjoin the measure, or is herself 
subject to an injunctive action to forestall some interference, the likelihood of 
prevailing equation could well come out to the state’s advantage.  By the time 
the matter was resolved, the data on the SIF would probably be enough to 
negate many of the Attorney General’s direst claims—or show that the 
intervention is not worthwhile anyway. 
4. Never Mind: Political Paths Around the Courts 
The politics of drug control and harm reduction do not always play 
themselves out in court.  If the federal government takes no formal action 
against—or even supports—a state-approved SIF, the fact that some people 
can make arguments that the SIF is illegal will not have any practical impact 
on the experiment.  Conversely, the power of the purse gives congressional 
opponents of an SIF a powerful way to express their feelings.  The federal ban 
on funding syringe exchanges did not prevent them from spreading, but has 
 
proclaimed Mr. Dooley, follows the election returns.” (citing FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. 
DOOLEY AT HIS BEST 77 (1938))). 
 239. See Gonzales v. Raich 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra 
notes 215–19 and accompanying text. 
 240. Some have gone so far as to argue that Raich signaled the death-knell for “as-applied” 
challenges to a congressional exercise of Commerce Clause authority.  Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, 
and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 705, 706 (2006) (“After Raich . . . facial challenges appear to be 
the only type of Commerce Clause challenge that remains viable.”). 
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certainly been an impediment to scale-up.  Congress could also go further, by 
limiting some forms of federal funding to jurisdictions that operate SIFs. 
A confrontation is by no means inevitable. We have so far assumed that 
the legal career of an SIF would track that of medical marijuana, with the 
innovating state facing active attempts at suppression from the federal 
government.  But the SIF may in practice look more—and be treated—like an 
SEP, which federal drug control agencies have never attacked.  The SIF, after 
all, is a marginal expansion of the basic services provided by an SEP—a 
needle exchange with chairs.  On that view, the DEA might not even be 
tempted to act.  If the DEA showed signs of interfering, the Attorney General 
could simply instruct the agency and other federal law enforcement personnel 
to ignore the SIF, either because she interprets the CSA to allow SIFs or in the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
The case of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act241 illustrates this approach.  
John Ashcroft was not the first U.S. Attorney General to consider whether 
prescribing lethal doses of controlled substances under the statute presented a 
federal legal issue.  After Oregon voters authorized the practice in 1994,242 
Attorney General Janet Reno determined that the CSA gave her no power to 
“displace the states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to 
override a state’s determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical 
practice.”243  On her orders, no federal threats against, or arrests or 
prosecutions of doctors involved in this program took place.244  The issue only 
became a federal case when the administration changed in 2000.245 
Moreover, the election of President Barack Obama and the deterioration of 
state fiscal conditions may significantly alter the cultural atmosphere 
surrounding drug regulation.  During the campaign, President Obama signaled 
a willingness to value science over tradition in drug policy.  When questioned 
whether he would stop DEA medical marijuana raids, then-Senator Obama 
noted: 
I would because I think our federal agents have better things to do, like 
catching criminals and preventing terrorism.  The way I want to approach the 
issue of medical marijuana is to base it on science.  And if there is sound 
science that supports the use of medical marijuana and if it is controlled and 
 
 241. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.995 (2007). 
 242. Id. (noting that certain provisions of the statute were enacted as part of Ballot Measure 
16 (1994)). 
 243. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Attorney General Reno on Oregon’s 
Death with Dignity Act (June 5, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/June/ 
259ag.htm.html. 
 244. Lindsay R. Kandra, Comment, Questioning the Foundation of Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s Attempt to Invalidate Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, 81 OR. L. REV. 505, 517 
(2002). 
 245. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
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prescribed in a way that other medicine is prescribed, then it’s something we 
should consider.246 
Despite concern that his commitment to this approach would dissolve or 
dissipate as President Obama installed his drug enforcement agencies, early 
indications suggest that his belief in scientific reappraisal remains robust as 
confirmed by his recently appointed Attorney General.247  The practicality of 
this philosophical position is buttressed by the cost of investigating and 
prosecuting such activities and the growing constraints on state funding. 
The legislative branch may signal its disapproval through the power of the 
purse at its disposal.248  As it did in the case of syringe exchange, Congress 
could forbid the use of any federal funds in the operation of an SIF.  This 
would not stop a state from going forward, but it would put the political weight 
of Congress on the side of opponents in other states watching the experiment, 
and would to some extent chill NIH and CDC funding for SIF research and 
evaluation.  Although highly unlikely, Congress could, in theory, go further, by 
limiting or entirely cutting off federal funds to any program, agency, or entire 
jurisdiction that operated an SIF.  The barriers to such extreme measures are 
more political than legal: although the Court has suggested that there is some 
limit to the exercise of this power—“in some circumstances the financial 
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at 
which ‘pressure turns into compulsion’”249—no federalism challenge to 
Congress’s spending power has succeeded in the last sixty-five years.250  After 
 
 246. James Pitkin, Six Minutes with Barack, WILLAMETTE WK., May 14, 2008, 
http://wweek.com/editorial/3427/10974/. 
 247. When questioned whether he disagreed with President Obama’s medical marijuana 
campaign pledge, recently appointed Attorney General Eric Holder replied: 
No. . . . What the president said during the campaign, you’ll be surprised to know, will be 
consistent with what we’ll be doing in law enforcement.  He was my boss during the 
campaign.  He is formally and technically and by law my boss now.  What he said during 
the campaign is now American policy. 
Ryan Grim, Holder Vows to End Raids on Medical Marijuana Clubs, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 
26, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/26/holder-vows-to-end-raids_n_170119.html 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 248. The Spending Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”), allows Congress to spend money, and 
Congress may condition grants on states and localities complying with certain requirements. 
 249. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 250. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 
(2006) (upholding the Solomon Amendment, which not only withholds all Defense Department 
funds to all departments of “offending institutions,” but also funds administered by the 
Departments of Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education). 
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news emerged that San Francisco was considering the opening of such a 
facility, there was an effort in the House to impose just such a limitation.251 
CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM, EVIDENCE, AND LEARNING-BASED POLICY 
The SIF is a promising public health intervention.  If it works, it could 
prevent many overdose deaths, reduce the spread of infectious disease, 
promote the initiation of treatment among hard-core addicts, control costs 
associated with emergency room visits and requests for first responder 
assistance, lessen the frequency of improperly discarded syringes, and diminish 
the visibility of public injection.  In addition, the SIF represents a unique 
research environment for scientists studying a hard-to-reach population.  The 
available evidence from trials in other countries, and our own national 
experience with SEPs, provides reasonable assurance that SIFs will not be 
harmful.  The SIF, in short, is the sort of innovation that ought to be explored 
within a rational system of regulating drugs and their health consequences. 
The structure of our federal form of government is, on its face, quite 
favorable to the exploration of new policies of this kind.252  Successful policies 
developed locally have routinely spread both vertically (local-to-state-to-
federal) and horizontally (local-to-local or state-to-state).253  In matters of 
health, the Constitution leaves a great store of police power in the states.254  
Though the federal role in internal public health matters has properly and 
necessarily grown, the day-to-day responsibility for dealing with HIV, 
overdose, and drug dependency remains on the shoulders of state and local 
 
 251. H.R. 3043, 110th Cong. (2007) (engrossed amendment as passed by Senate, Oct. 23, 
2007) (barring the distribution of Federal funds to cities that provide safe haven to illegal drug 
users through the use of illegal drug injection facilities); H.R. REP. NO. 110–424, at 214 (2007) 
(Conf. Rep.) (“The conference agreement deletes without prejudice a general provision proposed 
by the Senate that prohibits funds in the Act from being allocated, directed, or otherwise made 
available to cities that provide safe haven to illegal drug users through the use of illegal drug 
injection facilities. The House bill did not include a similar provision.”). 
 252. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”).  But see Stephen M. Griffin, Stop Federalism Before It Kills Again: 
Reflections on Hurricane Katrina, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 527 (2007) (describing a 
case of federalism fostering poor practices and dysfunctional governance). 
 253. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the 
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2007).  Cf. JAMES MANOR, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION (1999) (analyzing importance of 
decentralized government in development); Wolfgang Kerber & Martina Eckardt, Policy 
Learning in Europe: The Open Method of Co-Ordination and Laboratory Federalism, 14 J. 
EUROPEAN PUB. POL’Y 227 (2007) (discussing federalist policy processes in the EU). 
 254. See GOSTIN, supra note 84. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1148 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1089 
governments.  Our federal structure creates the conditions for the happy 
exploitation of comparative advantage.  Just as the CDC’s role as a federal 
health agency gives it an ability to concentrate expertise and coordinate a 
network of health agencies that no state or local health department can rival, so 
state and local health agencies have, by virtue of their work at the coalface, a 
unique ability to identify and test new, creative approaches.  Yet, as this 
Article has shown, neither the need to innovate nor the formal legal structure 
supportive of innovation is enough to guarantee that policy experimentation 
will go forward.  Much will depend upon how health officials and advocates at 
the state level cope with the uncertainties, unintended consequences, and 
looming menace of federal drug control policy. 
Thus, we return to Professor Johnson’s argument.255  Plenty of people in 
public health and harm reduction are prepared to regard the CSA, at least in so 
far as it grounds a “war on drugs,” as a “bad law” in her terms.  Even if one 
accepts the formal proposition of prohibitionist drug control as outlined in the 
law, in practice the “shadow system” of large scale imprisonment of drug users 
and small-time dealers seems to confound any therapeutic intent.256  To the 
extent it enshrines in law a cultural “euphoriphobia,”257 or targets substances 
(marijuana, for example) that are no more, and arguably less, harmful than 
currently legal ones (tobacco, for example), it is merely arbitrary.  To the 
extent it is meant to reduce the aggregate individual and social harms of drug 
use, it simply fails.258  How can it make any sense for a law that purports to 
protect society from the harms of drug dependency, to prohibit the testing of 
new public health programs that aim to do exactly that?  Under what logic is 
research on health care for drug users equated with promoting drug use? 
“Bad law” claims often signal real problems—and only a few die-hards 
could really insist that our current drug policy is free of them—but bad law 
claims are not prescriptions for reform.  They do not begin to answer hard 
questions about what regulatory models would be better.  One need only 
imagine a world in which tobacco or alcohol companies began to market 
cocaine to realize that replacing prohibition with regulation would bring 
daunting regulatory challenges all its own.  Bad law claims are valuable, as 
Professor Johnson argues, because they convey important information that 
should be appreciated by policy-makers and stakeholders alike about how the 
 
 255. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 256. Johnson, supra note 1, at 995–1005. 
 257. The term was coined by Don C. Des Jarlais, Prospects for a Public Health Perspective 
on Psychoactive Drug Use, Editorial, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 335, 336 (2000), to capture the 
extent to which drug policy seems to be driven by the belief that substances that give pleasure are 
bad even if they have few or no harmful effects. 
 258. MacCoun and Reuter usefully express the “total harm” of drug use with this equation: 
“Total Harm = Prevalence x Intensity x Harmfulness.”  MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 6, at 
10. 
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law is operating.259  The willingness of actors within a regulatory system to 
accept and respond to this sort of information—to learn—ought also to be seen 
for what it is: a basic measure of a system’s health.260 
Drug policy is a realm in which real learning has been rare.261  The explicit 
goals, implicit assumptions, and effectiveness of the current policy have all 
become matters of dogma.  It is entirely fitting that MacCoun and Reuter 
entitled their careful analysis of the evidence for the current system and 
possible alternatives Drug War Heresies.262  Those who question the faith are 
castigated as apostates, and treated accordingly.  Efforts to test any of the 
pillars of the faith, or, more importantly, to explore alternative paths, are 
opposed and, if possible, crushed with righteous indignation.  The result is that 
the problem of how best to reduce the individual and social costs of drug 
consumption cannot be addressed by the method most likely, given our 
imperfect knowledge and cultural divisions, to lead us to a substantially 
different and more salubrious approach: incremental policy experimentation 
focused on applying specific regulatory tools to manageable elements of the 
problem.263 
We do not speak in terms of “evidence-based policy.”  The acquisition and 
critical use of evidence relevant to government policy choices and the 
evaluation of policies once enacted are certainly good things.264  A certain 
amount of direct and analogous evidence was necessary before SIFs could 
even be considered worth trying.  It took trials in other countries and more than 
a decade of experience with SEPs to get local health officials in U.S. cities to 
 
 259. Johnson, supra note 1, at 975–80. 
 260. The argument that learning, or inability to learn, is an important characteristic of 
regulatory systems is made in a number of interesting literatures.  See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, 
Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL AND 
WELFARE LAW 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987); Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. 
J. LEGAL PHIL. 30 (2005); Rosie Cooney & Andrew T.F. Lang, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: 
Adaptive Governance and International Trade, 18 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 523, 523–24 (2007) 
(“[A]daptive governance accepts and responds to uncertainty by promoting learning in and 
through the policy-making process.  It does so in a number of ways: by avoiding irreversible 
interventions and impacts, by encouraging constant monitoring of outcomes; by facilitating the 
participation of multiple voices in transparent policy-making processes; and by reflexively 
highlighting the limitations of the knowledge on which policy choices are based.”). 
 261. One need only compare the rich social science literature on tobacco and alcohol control 
with what is known about drug policy to see the difference.  See Substance Abuse Policy 
Research Program, http://www.saprp.org/ (Last visited Apr. 28, 2009). 
 262. See MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 6. 
 263. Burris & Strathdee, supra note 13. 
 264. See, e.g., Mark Gibson, When Good Information Truly Matters: Public Sector Decision 
Makers Acquiring and Using Research to Inform Their Decisions, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 551 (2006); 
Ian Sanderson, Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-Based Policy Making, 80 PUB. ADMIN. 
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begin considering SIF trials.  But the phrase “evidence-based policy” does not 
really capture the challenges of innovation in controversial domains like drug 
policy.  Generally, people influence evidence more than evidence influences 
people; that is, we typically interpret evidence based on our prior beliefs or 
cultural associations rather than “objectively.”265  Thus, resort to “evidence” is, 
often enough, merely the continuation of ideological warfare by other 
means,266 and calling for “evidence-based policy” is, in important ways, just 
restating the problem of getting people to pay attention to evidence in the first 
place. 
More specifically, a case like the SIF involves the deployment of new 
measures in order to generate evidence.  To be fair (let alone logical), one can 
hardly demand that people put aside plausible consequentialist or internally 
consistent deontological concerns on the ground that the evidence that justifies 
the test also compels acceptance of the innovation.267  While not inconsistent 
with “evidence-based” policy, “policy learning” provides in our view a better 
heuristic for defining the issues before us as a polity, and a better guide to what 
needs to be done and why. 
“Policy learning” posits that developing effective policy is a cyclical 
process of experimentation, evaluation, and recalibration.  It takes seriously 
what we don’t know and the limits of our ability to predict how well policies 
will work.  It thus insists that policies be evaluated and that evaluation 
outcomes be used to adjust policies and implementation practices.  An 
important difference between policy learning and evidence-based policy is the 
former’s greater emphasis on using the collection and interpretation of 
evidence as a way to promote its credibility, salience, and accessibility.  In 
articulating a model of “adaptive governance,” Cooney and Lang put the 
matter like this: 
[T]he production of knowledge [is] . . . always and inevitably in part a social 
and political process.  And we understand science-based decision-making 
necessarily to involve fundamental value choices.  To the extent that 
uncertainty results from the necessary incompleteness of any single vision of 
knowledge, and of human cognition generally, adaptive governance 
approaches therefore necessitate a pluralist approach to knowledge.  In this 
context, the . . . . policy-making is less about the attainment of a single optimal 
solution—as if ‘best practice’ were simply a question of efficiency—and more 
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about providing a forum for the ongoing creation of consensual knowledge and 
agreed processes to guide policy.268 
A “pluralist approach to knowledge” entails open and transparent processes of 
planning, implementing, and evaluation, in which “broader participation in the 
production and deployment of knowledge” is accomplished through 
participatory research and analysis processes.269  Participatory policy-making 
has its limits, not the least of which is that citizens and even direct stakeholders 
may be more willing to casually criticize than to invest in serious 
participation.270  Nonetheless, with some planning and a little luck, the process 
of deciding whether to undertake a policy innovation can become a mechanism 
for competing interest groups to consider problems and policy options in a 
framework of evidence rather than ideology. 
The idea of policy learning frames a question like the opening of an SIF 
not as a decision about whether or not SIFs should be integrated into drug 
policy, but as an inquiry into their potential value.  As a process, it would aim 
to convene as many as possible of the key interest groups that have a stake in 
the public drug scene: homelessness, emergency health services, health care 
finance, harm reduction, public health, law enforcement, and drug treatment.  
Over a period of months, those stakeholders interested enough to participate 
would look together at the data defining the problems to be solved and the fit 
of various options, including SIFs, with those problems.  Over time, the hope is 
that the effort becomes an exercise in specific problem solving that may or 
may not work, rather than a new front on the ideological war over drug 
policy.271  Involving even those who disagree in the planning and evaluation of 
an SIF is a way to maximize the chances that the evidence gathered is attended 
to.  Policy learning is not natural, but it can be fostered. 
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Local participatory research and decision-making processes are not a cure 
for ideology or interest group politics,272 but they are an underutilized tool for 
getting reasonable consensus among interested stakeholders on particular 
measures in particular places.  Nor is policy learning a particularly rigid 
heuristic.  The typical processes of local political mobilization, outreach, and 
coalition building can operate in the same spirit and much the same way.  
Indeed, on occasion, even the legislative process takes on something of this 
approach.  The career of syringe access policy in Connecticut is an illustration.  
The initial state bill to authorize a pilot SEP emerged from several years of 
local advocacy and education in New Haven.273  There was no evidentiary 
question as to the severity of HIV in the city, but at the time there was no 
evidence on the utility of SEPs as HIV prevention that could compel a 
conclusion as to its effectiveness or side effects.  Well-conducted political 
advocacy by proponents carried the day, but the 1990 law authorized SEP only 
as an experiment, and included a strong evaluation component.274 
The learning followed.  As the effects were studied and appeared 
positive,275 health officials elsewhere in Connecticut and the United States 
began to visit, and people involved in the New Haven exchange began to speak 
around the country.  Hartford started an SEP in 1991,276 and in 1992, the state 
legislature reviewed the evidence from the New Haven evaluations and not 
only authorized more SEPs but also eliminated the prescription requirement for 
sale or possession of ten or fewer syringes.277  In subsequent years, the 
Connecticut legislature raised the limit for non-prescription sale or possession 
to thirty, and removed syringes from the drug paraphernalia law altogether.278  
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The New Haven data and Connecticut’s policy learning process also probably 
helped the diffusion of SEPs elsewhere in the United States.  To be sure, the 
pace of policy learning about SEPs has been painfully slow, lagging 
substantially behind the evidence.  Only in 2006, for example, did New Jersey 
and Delaware—two states with chronic, serious epidemics of HIV among 
IDUs—even authorize SEPs,279 though federal health authorities (and any 
number of expert bodies) had been affirming their effectiveness as far back as 
the Clinton administration.280 The testing, diffusion, and scale-up of SEPs was 
tragically slow and, in that sense, no model for SIFs.  Yet, the rise of SEPs in 
cities across the country does show that local policy learning can not only build 
an evidence base but result in substantial improvements in public health—
provided the federal government does not act as a powerful retarding force. 
The suitability of our federal system to this sort of incremental 
development of policy innovations is obvious, which is why the notion of 
states as laboratories for democracy has become a cliché.  Yet, in spite of its 
vitality in practice, the Supreme Court’s treatment of it in cases amounts too 
often to lip service.  We do not, of course, propose adaptive governance as a 
rule of law, but we do see it as a value implicit in federalism that deserves 
some weight in the Court’s analysis of cases like the SIF.  Where a state or 
local government has undertaken a deliberate policy test, with reasonable basis 
to believe it will do no harm and with a serious plan to evaluate the outcome, 
the Court should apply rules of statutory construction, preemption, or 
Commerce Clause regulation with all the more prudence and caution. 
To say that the protection of health is a fundamental duty of government 
ought likewise to be more than rhetoric.  As Wendy Parmet argues, population 
health deserves weight as a norm in our public law.  “All other things being 
equal,” she writes, “legal decision-makers should consider the promotion of 
population health as a relevant factor in their analysis.”281  But that means 
more than talk.  In giving content to this norm, she argues, judges and other 
legal decision-makers should accept, even internalize, public health methods, 
like the testing of plausible new interventions, and learn from the results.282  If 
promoting population health is a goal of the law, it follows that “legal decision 
makers must understand the population health impact and context of the issues 
before them and the decisions they render.  This requires that they have both a 
familiarity with epidemiology and medicine and a willingness to engage in 
empirical and probabilistic reasoning.”283  However ambitious this might be in 
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other matters, in the case of an SIF very little is required: officials and judges 
are asked merely to understand that public health proponents of an SIF are 
seeking to test an important hypothesis developed from plausible evidence.  
Questions of the effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and unintended 
consequences of an SIF are empirical; to ask them is not to assert an answer. 
Professor Johnson writes that “[d]octors frequently claim that the very law 
intended to improve the lot of their patients is instead making the doctors 
provide poor care.”284  This happens, she persuasively argues, in substantial 
part because the claims of doctors—and in the case of harm reduction, other 
public health actors—are written off as the self-serving or ideologically driven 
make-weights of people concerned only for their own self-interested goals.285  
A dram of skepticism about human nature is healthy for individual judgment, 
but at the doses our polity has been taking, this sort of mistrust is tragically 
corrosive.  Experimenting with new policies is the only way we will learn our 
way out of the present drug policy mess.  We should encourage, facilitate, 
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